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1.1  Introduction: The Question of Tax  Harmonization 
The determination of tax policy is among the most sovereign functions of 
governments. The choices to be made include of the level of tax revenues to 
be collected  (and hence the level of public  sector spending), the economic 
activities to be taxed (the tax bases and the tax mix), the distribution of the tax 
burden over different groups and income classes in the country, and the distri- 
bution  of  the tax revenues to different levels of government in the country. 
From an economic point of view, there are a number of criteria that might be 
used in formulating tax policy. These include minimizing the burden on the 
population of raising the given amount of revenue, minimizing the administra- 
tive  costs of  the tax  system  both  to the government  and  to the  taxpayers, 
achieving the desired amount of income redistribution, increasing the stability 
and predictability of  the revenue base, and using tax policy as an instrument 
of industrial and regional policy. These objectives are conflicting to some ex- 
tent. The way in which the conflicts are resolved is through the political pro- 
cess of the country. 
The question of tax harmonization  concerns the conflict between  the de- 
mand for different tax policies across countries and the pressure for tax uni- 
formity that arises because economies  are highly  integrated  due to interna- 
tional  mobility  of  capital,  goods  and  services,  and,  perhaps,  labor.  The 
question would not arise if economies were segregated so that differences in 
the tax systems were irrelevant (except perhaps through a “demonstration  ef- 
fect”),  nor would  it arise if  there were no incentives for countries  to have 
different  tax  systems. (But countries with  identical policy  objectives might 
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still attempt to differentiate their tax structures, in order to shift the burden of 
taxation to other countries.)  However, economies are becoming increasingly 
integrated in terms of the cross-border flow of goods, services and, especially, 
capital. Although there are still substantial barriers to the free movement of 
labor, these too are likely to fall-in  Europe in 1992, and possibly between 
Canada and the  United  States as their economies become more tightly  en- 
twined as the free-trade agreement is phased in. 
Despite  this  trend  toward  economic  integration,  national  governments 
maintain the viewpoint, possibly an illusion, of  setting independent tax poli- 
cies, although the constraints imposed on such policy making by international 
considerations have been increasingly recognized. Among the most important 
pressures  for tax harmonization  in the presence of economic integration  are 
the following: 
i. International mobility of factors and income. In the presence of different 
tax burdens, which are not compensated by equivalent benefits (that are some- 
how conditional on taxes paid), factor owners will locate their factors across 
tax jurisdictions  so as to minimize the tax burden.  Moreover,  such interna- 
tional “tax planning” may not require the physical movement of factors. Mul- 
tinational  corporations  can readily  shift capital income  across  international 
borders through accounting procedures. 
ii. Overlapping  tax jurisdictions. The fact that the residence of  a factor 
owner may differ from the factor’s location gives rise to the possibility  that 
more than one country will perceive itself as having taxing authority. This is 
particularly likely if  countries adopt, as most do, the world income of  their 
residents as the appropriate income tax base. It also arises because of the ex- 
istence of multinational corporations that operate in both tax jurisdictions. 
iii. International tax avoidance and tax arbitrage. While tax avoidance and 
arbitrage can occur within a country, the scope for such activities is expanded 
greatly  when economies  are highly integrated.  The ability of  residents in a 
country to locate income-generating  activities abroad reduces the  ability of 
the domestic tax authority to monitor taxable income and therefore to enforce 
taxation, since it is a general rule of law that one country does not take cog- 
nizance of the revenue laws of another country. Also, differences in the tax 
rates and bases of different countries open tax arbitrage opportunities, perhaps 
beyond  the  ability of  a  single country  to close, especially where there  are 
multinational  corporations  whose  activities  span the  different  tax jurisdic- 
tions. 
iv. Strategic considerations in  the setting  of tax policies. With integrated 
economies,  the best tax policies chosen by an individual country depend on 
the tax policies  chosen by other countries or, in the case of policy “leader- 
ship,” the policy reactions of  the other countries.  Thus, different tax policy 
instruments may be “strategic substitutes” (i.e., involve positive  spillovers) 
1. Gordon (ch. 2 in this volume) looks more closely at the economic pressures for tax harmo- 
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or “strategic complements” (negative spillovers) in the setting of tax policies 
by  other countries. A special example of such strategic considerations is the 
temptation facing the individual country to try to shift the tax burden to for- 
eigners. This may occur either through the standard tax incidence channels, 
whereby each country attempts to choose its tax policy so as to improve its 
terms of trade, or through “Bertrand competition” in tax rates, in which each 
country tries to attract taxable income from other countries (and hence reve- 
nue from other countries’ treasuries) by  offering lower tax rates. These types 
of policies are of the “beggar-thy-neighbor” sort and more often than not lead 
to a situation in which all countries are worse off.2 
It should be apparent that these same issues arise to some extent within a 
country that has multiple levels of  government, each having taxing powers, 
such as within a federation. Internal harmonization,. however, is more likely 
to be  accomplished through coordinated arrangements, since the scope for 
cooperation is greater. Not  only are the powers of the governments involved 
separated or subordinated constitutionally, but the ability to make intergovern- 
mental transfers exists. In contrast, harmonization of tax systems across coun- 
tries is more likely to come about through actions taken by countries individ- 
ually with limited amounts of cooperation. Among the issues to be addressed 
in this paper are the extent to which such “noncooperative” harmonization is 
sufficient for countries to obtain their tax objectives, and the extent to which 
further benefits can be gained through extending the cooperative harmoniza- 
tion arrangements that prevail internally to the international sphere. 
We  focus on harmonization issues related to the corporate and personal 
income tax systems of the United States and Canada. An essential distinction, 
which is made necessary by the openness of  a national economy, is between 
income taxes levied on the basis of residence of the recipient and income taxes 
levied on the basis of  the source of  the income, that is, the jurisdiction in 
which the income is generated. The issues involved are not unlike those raised 
by the distinction between indirect (sales) taxes levied on a destination basis 
and on an origin basis. However, the income tax systems of countries typically 
contain elements of both residence and source bases, unlike sales taxes, which 
tend to be one or the other. 
The ultimate objectives of the paper are to assess the extent to which inter- 
dependencies between the Canadian and U.S. economies impose pressures on 
the governments to adopt similar income tax systems and to consider whether 
coordinated measures could be desirable. On the first question, we conclude 
that the pressures for harmonization exist largely at the level of the corporate 
tax. Given the limited degree of  labor mobility across countries, residence- 
based taxes like the personal income tax can be, and are, considerably differ- 
ent across the two countries.  Nor  are there likely to be great pressures to 
change this. At the corporate level, pressures for harmonization are consider- 
2. Strategic considerations are only important if countries have market power. It could be ar- 
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ably stronger.  These arise from the free mobility of capital across countries, 
the fact that firms can operate simultaneously in several jurisdictions, the dif- 
ficulty  in  taxing  corporations  on  the  basis  of  residence,  and  the  existing 
method of  crediting foreign tax liabilities of corporations.  These imply that 
corporations  are effectively  taxed  on a  source basis  and that there will  be 
strong pressures for countries, especially small capital-importing ones, to de- 
sign their tax systems to conform with those of their creditor nations. In the 
case of Canada, there is considerable pressure to adopt a corporate tax system 
close to that of the United States. While the United States might seem to have 
more leeway, the fact that it operates in a wider world economy implies that 
its independence in setting corporate tax policy is also limited. Not  surpris- 
ingly, the corporate tax systems of  the United  States and Canada are much 
more similar than are the personal tax systems,  and are unlikely  to become 
less so in the future. Given this, and given the difficulties of implementing a 
coordinated system of tax harmonization  between sovereign countries,  it is 
not likely that the gains from a more explicit form of corporate tax harmoni- 
zation between the two countries would be sufficient to warrant instituting it. 
Further  substantive  gains might  only  be  accomplished  if  the  entire  world 
changed  the  basis  for taxing  corporations.  We  document  these  arguments 
more fully in the rest of the paper. 
We  begin in the next section by discussing the advantages  and disadvan- 
tages of tax harmonization.  We then describe the differing fiscal structures of 
the Canadian and American economies in section 1.3. We first examine the 
broad fiscal differences between the countries and then focus on the detailed 
differences in the personal and corporation income tax systems. We also ex- 
amine differences in the internal tax harmonization arrangements between the 
two countries,  and  finally  we examine  how  cross-border  income flows are 
currently  treated  by  each country.  In  section  1.4 we  analyze the  extent to 
which pressures for income tax harmonization are likely to impinge on inde- 
pendent income tax policy making in the two countries as a result of increas- 
ing economic integration. We consider the specific issue of taxing income to 
capital, which is distinguished from factors such as labor and land by its high 
degree of mobility across the. international border. Specifically we analyze the 
difficulties in using the corporation and personal income tax systems in con- 
junction with each other (say, as an integrated income tax system) in order to 
tax income to capital as it accrues. The difficulties arise because of the cross- 
border  investments  of  multinational  corporations.  In  section  1.5 we  offer 
some brief conclusions and recommendations and extend the discussion to the 
broader perspective of worldwide corporate tax harmonization. 
1.2  The Costs and Benefits of Tax Harmonization 
It will be useful at the outset to define what we mean by harmonization, 
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another. Harmonization is a qualitative term which refers generally to the de- 
gree of  uniformity of  the tax system across jurisdictions-here,  c~untries.~ 
Departures from uniformity could be in terms of the tax base or the rate struc- 
ture, or both. As well, harmonization may involve jurisdictional and enforce- 
ment provisions. The jurisdictional provisions involve how to divide the tax 
base among jurisdictions when the same tax unit is operating in both jurisdic- 
tions. For example, if income is to be taxed on the basis of source, a common 
means for determining the source of  income must be  adopted. Similarly, if 
taxation is based on residence, an agreed-upon means of determining the res- 
idence of the taxpayer must be established. These agreements reduce the pos- 
sibility of  the double taxation of  income, or its zero taxation; to do so fully 
may require agreeing to a common base as well. Enforcement involves agree- 
ing to enforce.  each other’s laws and to exchange information. 
Tax harmonization can come about through cooperative or noncooperative 
means. Cooperative harmonization involves an agreement between jurisdic- 
tions to adopt certain measures of  uniformity, such as a common base, rate 
structure, allocation rules, and exchange of information for enforcement. This 
is the form of  harmonization in existence in many  federal states, including 
Canada, and to a lesser extent, the United States. The European Economic 
Community, as part of the attempt to remove fiscal frontiers within Europe, is 
trying to agree to some measures of  tax harmonization, particularly in the 
VAT  area. In the case of Canada and the United States, income tax harmoni- 
zation has been largely noncooperative. That is, the countries decide their 
own tax policies in a decentralized fashion, taking as given the tax policies of 
other countries (or, in the case of a “leader” country, taking as given a reaction 
function of others). Competitive pressures may nonetheless induce some uni- 
formity in  the tax  systems. And  some agreement on the taxation of  cross- 
border income flows exists in the form of the tax treaty provisions. 
Evaluating the benefits and costs of tax harmonization requires distinguish- 
ing among objectives. From a worldwide perspective, it could be argued that 
a single tax system with a single tax collecting authority would be optimal. 
However, for a decentralized world in which different countries have different 
sizes of public sectors and place different weights on equity versus efficiency 
objectives, a fully uniform tax would not be optimal. There will always be a 
conflict between worldwide objectives and national objectives of tax systems. 
In the context of a decentralized  world with separate  tax collection systems, 
it is possible to enumerate several beneficial effects of tax harmonization. The 
main ones are as follows: 
3. Defining harmonization with reference to the degree of uniformity in tax structures achieved 
is not the only possibility. One could instead define harmonization in terms  of the behavior of 
governments. For  example, Mintz and Idkens (1991) define tax harmonization “as any agree- 
ments undertaken by jurisdictions  to correct, in a cooperative way, the effects of fiscal externalities 
resulting from noncooperative behavior”. We  wish to use the  concept in a way that allows for 
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i. Production eficiency. Reductions in the differential tax treatment of dif- 
ferent factors of  production will reduce production inefficiency in the allo- 
cation of  resources across countries.  Differential effective tax  rates across 
countries, ceteris paribus,  may provide an incentive for factors to move to 
lower-taxed jurisdictions. The economic costs of this will be higher the more 
mobile are the factors of production. Given the fact that capital tends to move 
freely among countries while labor does not (e.g., because of  immigration 
laws), this problem is more serious for capital than for labor. Thus, the bene- 
fits from harmonizing personal taxes levied on  a residence basis (including 
personal capital income) are relatively low, except perhaps for certain cate- 
gories of persons who may be internationally mobile. For indirect taxes levied 
on  a destination basis,  the benefits from harmonization may be  somewhat 
larger. The reason is that the destination principle may be difficult to enforce 
for certain types of transactions, such as services and cross-border shopping. 
To  the extent that these can be controlled, the benefits from harmonizing are 
low. The real problems arise in the taxation of corporations. There are serious 
difficulties in attempting to tax corporations on  a residence basis,  whether 
residence is defined on the basis of the owners of the corporation or not. Thus, 
in practice, corporation income, at least equity income, is taxed on an origin 
basis. Since corporate capital is internationally mobile, different effective tax 
rates in different jurisdictions will lead to productive inefficiency, or  interna- 
tional inefficiency in the allocation of capital. Much of  our discussion in this 
paper will focus on the issue of harmonizing of the corporation income tax. 
ii. Avoidance of  tax arbitrage.  The more harmonized are corporate tax 
bases and rates, the fewer are the opportunities for avoidance of tax by inter- 
national tax arbitrage by corporations operating in more than one jurisdiction. 
This can take many forms. One is via transfer pricing in vertically integrated 
firms. Related to this is setting up subsidiaries or residence in low-tax jurisdic- 
tions and arranging to have much of taxable income taken in that jurisdiction. 
Another is by  purely financial transactions, such as raising debt in countries 
of high tax rates to take advantage of interest deductibility provisions. The use 
of  formula apportionment for  determining the  origin  of  tax  bases  avoids 
some of  these problems,  especially those involving financial transactions, 
since the formulas are typically based solely on real variables such as location 
of sales, wages, and capital assets. 
iii. Simplicity of  administration and  compliance. Tax  harmonization can 
lead to savings in the cost of tax collection and compliance. This is especially 
true if jurisdictions use a common tax base and formula apportionment rules. 
Then a single set of  accounts will suffice, rather than separate accounts for 
each jurisdiction. Even greater savings can be obtained if there is a single tax 
collection authority, as is sometimes the case among jurisdictions in federal 
countries (e.g., Canada). 
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arrangements that include tax base allocation rules is that the same income 
will not be taxed twice, or not taxed at all. To  avoid fully the possibility of 
double taxation or nontaxation requires both a common base and a common 
allocation formula. Of course, it will still be the case that income will be taxed 
at different rates in different jurisdictions, but it will not be taxed by two juris- 
dictions at the same time (or by none). 
v. Avoidance oftax competition. Different jurisdictions setting their tax sys- 
tems in a decentralized manner will naturally be in a competitive situation, if 
only implicitly. If  income is taxed on a source basis, there may be an advan- 
tage to each from reducing its tax rate to increase its tax base, given the behav- 
ior of the other. Since each will be acting in the same manner, the net effect 
will be to compete tax rates to a suboptimal level, to the detriment of both. If 
the countries are of different sizes, the gains may accrue more to one country 
than to another. Of course, some tax competition may be a good thing, in the 
sense that it leads to more uniform rates. However, if it also leads to rates that 
are too low for the purposes of fulfilling the withholding function of the cor- 
poration income tax or if it eliminates the taxation of economic rents, that will 
be a disadvantage. The seriousness of this problem clearly depends upon the 
role of the corporate tax. If  the world consisted of  nations levying personal 
taxes on consumption, so that the corporation income tax was not needed for 
domestic withholding purposes, and if there were no economic rents or prof- 
its, it might be desirable for nations to compete the corporate tax away en- 
tirely. 
These beneficial effects, whether they come about cooperatively or non- 
cooperatively, must be set against the costs of  harmonization. The latter are 
simply the constraints imposed on the ability of  nations to pursue their own 
independent tax policy objectives. For example, as we argue below, a corpo- 
rate income tax designed purely for domestic reasons might be  viewed pri- 
marily as a withholding device for the personal income tax. In this case, its 
base and rate structure would be chosen to complement that of  the personal 
tax, and the two taxes would be integrated by a method such as imputation. 
However, in an open economy, there are good reasons why the corporate tax 
might be forced to conform with corporate taxes levied elsewhere, even in a 
noncooperative setting. This will constrain the use of  the corporate tax as a 
domestic withholding device and may also compromise the design of the per- 
sonal income tax. Thus, the pressures for harmonization, where they exist, 
will compromise domestic policy objectives. In other cases, harmonization 
may not conflict with domestic policy. This is especially the case where co- 
operative harmonization schemes are negotiated to reduce tax competition and 
evasion. In these cases, there are net gains to be shared among the parties to 
the agreement. In the end, any conflicts between the benefits and costs of 
harmonization will  have to be resolved by  political judgment,  since value 
judgments about tax policy will be involved. 32  Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce 
1.3  Differences in the Fiscal Systems of the United States and Canada 
The problem of harmonizing tax systems arises because countries want to 
pursue different tax structures and policies.  Different tax structures and poli- 
cies in turn  may  reflect differences in the amounts of  government  spending 
desired, the types of government spending, and the levels of government re- 
sponsible for the  spending. In this  section we briefly examine the different 
fiscal environments of  the  United  States and Canada and describe  in some 
detail how the income tax systems and internal harmonization measures differ 
between the two countries. We also examine the existing provisions governing 
the taxation of cross-border income flows. This will serve to put our analysis 
into perspective. 
1.3.1  The Differing Fiscal Environments: Some Stylized Facts 
Although both the Canadian and U.S. governments are federal in nature, 
they  differ  in many key  respects. The roles that the governments  have as- 
sumed, the division of responsibilities between federal and state or provincial 
governments, the fiscal relations between the two levels of  government, and 
the tax systems all differ considerably across the two countries. From an eco- 
nomic perspective, responsibilities are far more decentralized in Canada than 
in the United States, as reflected by greater relative spending by the provinces 
as compared with the states. For example, as seen in tables 1.1 and 1.2, the 
fraction of total spending by all levels of government in Canada accounted for 
by provincial and local governments averaged 60% during the period  1980- 
89, while for the United States the comparable fraction is 38%. Moreover, this 
fraction has been growing steadily in Canada, whereas it has remained rela- 
tively constant in the United States since the 1960s. 
In Canada, the provinces assume responsibility for basically all health, edu- 
cation, and welfare expenditures. They finance these with a combination of 
their own revenues and substantial transfers received from the federal govern- 
ment. The exceptions are public pensions and unemployment  insurance, for 
which  the  federal government  has acquired  responsibility  by constitutional 
amendment.  The  federal  government  also  makes  extensive  redistributive 
transfers to the needy  provinces, and is now obliged by the constitution to 
continue to do  SO.^  In the United  States, a larger proportion  of  health and 
welfare expenditures is federally financed, although, of course, the level of 
public intervention remains much smaller in the United States than in Canada 
in the areas of  health, education, and welfare.  Surprisingly, transfers to per- 
sons are slightly more important than spending on goods and services by the 
U.S.  government relative to the Canadian. In the United States, transfers to 
persons as a percentage of total expenditures averaged 35% for all govern- 
4.  Section 36 of  the Constitution Act, 1982, imposed such an obligation formally, essentially 
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Table 1.1  U.S. Tax and Expenditure Structure 
(Decade Averages) 
~  ~~~ 
Years  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1950-59  .68  .31  .I0  .I9  .32  .22 
1960-69  .68  .22  .14  .22  .38  .25 
1970-79  .72  .I6  .I9  .32  .43  ..29 
1980-89  .14  .I1  .21  .35  .38  .35 
Notes:  (I) Total income taxesitotal  revenues,  all levels of  government; (2) Corporate income 
taxesitotal income taxes, all levels of  government; (3) Total income taxes (state and 1ocal)itotal 
income taxes (all); (4) Transfers to persons/total expenditures, all levels of  government; (5) State 
and  local expendituresiexpenditures all levels; (6)  State and  local income taxesitotal state and 
local revenue. “Total income taxes” include personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, and 
social insurance contributions. 
Table 1.2  Canadian Tax and Expenditure Structure 
(Decade Averages) 
Years  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1950-59  .35  .54  .05  .I8  .45  .05 
1960-69  .33  .41  .I1  .20  .53  .I3 
1970-79  .38  .26  .33  .31  .59  .21 
1980-89  .37  .20  .39  .33  .60  .23 
Notes:  (1)  Total  income  taxesitotal revenues,  all levels of  government; (2) Corporate income 
taxedtotal income taxes, all levels of  government; (3) Total income taxes (provincial and local)/ 
total income taxes (all); (4) Transfers to personsitotal expenditures, all levels of  government; (5) 
Provincial and local expenditures/expenditures all levels; (6) Provincial and local income taxes/ 
total provincial and local revenue. “Total income taxes” include personal income taxes, corporate 
income taxes, and social insurance contributions. 
ments combined over the decade 1980-89,  while for Canada the comparable 
figure is 33%. This is true despite the larger component of  defense spending 
in  the U.S.  budget.  In  both  countries,  the percentage  of  expenditures ac- 
counted for by  transfer spending has grown rapidly during the postwar dec- 
ades. 
Governments in both countries obtain their revenues from a tax mix  that 
includes both indirect and direct taxes. Direct taxes, including personal and 
corporation income taxes plus payroll tax contributions to the public pension 
plan, averaged 37% of combined government revenues in Canada over the 
decade 1980-89.  In the United States, the comparable share was 74%. Thus, 
the U.S. government is much more dependent on income taxes for revenues 
than is Canada. The relative importance of total income taxes in both coun- 
tries has risen over the postwar decades. Despite this, the corporation income 
tax has declined in relative importance in both countries. In the decade 1950- 
59, the corporation income tax accounted for 54% of total income tax reve- 
nues of  all governments in  Canada and 31% in  the United States. By the 
1980s, this fraction had declined to 20% and 1  I%, respectively. This trend is 34  Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce 
remarkably  similar  for  both  countries,  suggesting that harmonization  pres- 
sures with respect to corporation income taxes may be considerable. Income 
taxes on persons have accounted for the growth in direct taxation in both coun- 
tries. However, in the United States growth in the social security payroll tax 
has been much greater than in Canada, particularly in the past decade. 
The U.S. federal government uses only direct taxes as major tax sources, 
while the Canadian federal government also levies an indirect sales tax, the 
manufacturers’ sales tax, which was replaced  with a 7% value-added  tax in 
January 1991 (the so-called Goods and Services Tax). The provinces and most 
states.use both  direct and indirect taxes,  the latter being a retail  sales tax. 
Income taxes are a more important source of revenue for the provinces than 
for the states, with income tax revenues collected by provincial governments 
averaging 39% of total income taxes over the 1980s; in the United States, state 
and  local  governments  collected  21% of  total  income taxes over the  same 
period. 
1.3.2  Differences between the Canadian and U.S. Income Tax Systems 
While the Canadian and U.S. personal and corporate income tax systems 
have many features in common, they also have some important differences, 
both in the tax base and the tax rate structure. The personal income tax sys- 
tems in both countries are accurately described as “hybrid” annual income and 
consumption taxes, although some features are inconsistent with either pure 
base. Both countries tax at least some components of capital income accruing 
to households, and both have well-developed corporation income tax systems, 
which act as backstops for the personal tax systems. Canada follows a modi- 
fied imputation approach, which allows for some integration between the per- 
sonal and corporate tax systems, while the United States has a classical system 
in which no credit is given to shareholders for corporate taxes paid. In this 
part, we discuss the major differences between the income tax systems of the 
two countries. These differences are summarized in table 1.3. 
Diferences in the Personal Income and Payroll Tax Systems 
The  Tax Base  and  Unit. Both  countries  tax  annual  employment  income, 
broadly  defined to include most cash market transactions.  In Canada,  most 
payments in kind, such as employer-paid fringe benefits, are included in tax- 
able  income.  The main  exception  is contributions to pension  plans.  In the 
United States, many fringe benefits remain tax exempt. Government transfer 
payments are, for the most part, fully taxed in Canada.5 Most transfer receipts 
were untaxed in the United  States until the second half of  the  1980s, when 
unemployment insurance benefits and half of social security benefits to high- 
5. The exception is the Guaranteed Income Supplement paid to low-income persons aged 65 
and over, which is nontaxable.  However, persons receiving it are unlikely to be taxable in any 
case. 35  Income Tax Harmonization 
Table 1.3  Notable Differences in the Canadian and U.S. Federal Income Tax 
Systems 
Canada  U.S. 





Child Care Expenses 









Deductible to limit 
Realized at death 
Subject to regulation 
Incorporated in Canada 
No 
Intercorporate Dividends  Exempt 




Private Pension Benefits 
Social Insurance Benefits 
Income Accruing on 
Pension Funds 
Interest 






Capital Gains (Realized) 
Taxable, except employer- 
Taxable with credit 
Taxable 
paid pension contribution 
Exempt (including RRSPs) 
Taxable 
3/4 included with $100,000 
life-time exemption and 




Exempt from active income 




Citizens and resident persons 
Family income 
Tax exemptions 
Declining tax credit 
Stepped up 
“Kiddie tax” 
Incorporated in U .  S. 
Affiliated domestic 




Exempt between affiliated 
Most employer-paid fringe 
Taxable 
Unemployment benefits and 
V’2  Social Security benefits 
tax a  b  1  e 
benefits exempt 
Exempt 
Taxable, except qualifying 
state and local bonds 
100% included with 
exemption for residence 
(limited) 
Taxable 
Taxable over $600.000 
Taxable when repatriated 
with FTC (controlled 
foreign affiliate) 
Exempt from controlled 
affiliate, 20% included 
otherwise 
Taxable 
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Table 1.3  (continued) 
Canada  U.S. 
Pertaining to the Tax Base (Deductions and Credits): 
Personal 
Mortgage Interest 
State and Local Taxes 
Medical Expenses 
Charitable Donations 
Social Insurance Contri- 








Investment Tax Credits 
Loss Carryover 
AMT 






Social Insurance payroll 
Tax 
Corporaie 
Tax Rate, Most Firms 
Rate Concessions to 
Small Businesses 








Deduction to limit 
Credit if from domestic 
corporations 
Property taxes deductible; 
resource allowance 




R&D, qualifying investment 




3 brackets, flat after $55,605 
(1989) 
29% in top bracket 
Above 3% 
4% and 5.5% 
9.4% (combined) to a 
maximum contribution of 
$3,000 
28%, 23% on manufacturing 
and processing income 
Smaller than $200,000 
Standard or itemized 
Deduction (large limit) 
Property and income tax 
deductions 
Deduction in excess of 7.5% 




Deduction if through 401(k); 
IRA limited to low- 
income taxpayers 
No credit or deduction 
Income taxes, property 
taxes, and royalties 
deductible 
8 classes, mandatory, “in” 
and “out” YZ year rule 
Switch to straight line 
LIFO or FIFO 
Cost for large oil and gas 
Incremental R&D 
firms, percentage for other 
Backward 3 years, forward 
Yes 
15 years 
3 brackets with “bubble”; 
33% in bubble 
Full 
None 
15.3% (combined) to a 
flat after $200,000 (1989) 
maximum contribution of 
$7,000 (1990) 
34% 
Smaller than $200,000, with 
39% bubble midsize 37  Income Tax Harmonization 
income persons were subjected to income tax. In Canada, the tax unit is the 
individual, but there are tax credits based on family size, and some tax reliefs 
are based on family income. In the United States, the tax unit is the family, 
and income tax schedules depend on the taxpayer’s marriage status. There are 
fixed exemptions for other dependents. 
There are also significant differences between the countries in their taxation 
of  the capital income of  persons.  Apart from that accruing in tax  shelters, 
nominal interest income is fully taxed in Canada as it accrues. This is also 
true in the United States, except for the exemption on interest from state and 
local bonds. Nominal capital gains are fully taxed  upon  realization in  the 
United States, but in Canada only three-quarters of realized gains are taxable 
and the individual taxpayer has a C$lOO,OOO cumulative lifetime exemption 
(higher for small businesses and family farms). Capital gains on a taxpayer’s 
personal residence are effectively exempt in both countries, although in  the 
United States the exemption can only be taken once in a lifetime, can be taken 
only by taxpayers aged 55 or over, and is limited to $125,000 of gains. Divi- 
dends are fully taxed in both countries, but  Canada allows a dividend tax 
credit (see below). 
There are notable departures from the Haig-Simons definition of  compre- 
hensive income in both countries. Income to owner-occupied housing, non- 
realized capital gains, and the accruing earnings on pension funds are exempt 
in  both  countries  (and  in  Canada,  Registered Retirement Savings  Plans, 
known as RRSPs). Gifts and lottery winnings are excluded in Canada, but the 
United States taxes lottery winnings and gifts and inheritances over $600,000. 
The tax systems of  the two countries differ notably with regard to deduc- 
tions from income. Expenses incurred in earning income and interest pay- 
ments on money borrowed to make taxable investments are deductible in both 
countries. In Canada, all persons can deduct (from earned income only) con- 
tributions to RRSPs up to a specified total less pension plan contributions. 
Less generous deductions for contributions to IRA plans are available to low- 
income households in the United States. Employee contributions to pension 
plans are not deductible in the United States, although effectively the same 
thing can be arranged through 401(k) plans. Limited child care expenses are 
deductible in Canada, but are creditable at a declining rate of  30% to 20% in 
the United  States.  Moving expenses are deductible in  Canada  and  in  the 
United States, but only as an itemized deduction in the latter (see below). 
The United States allows a choice between a standard deduction and an 
itemized deduction for mortgage interest, state and local taxes (except.  sales 
taxes), medical expenses in excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross income, moving 
expenses, casualty losses, and charitable donations. Canada allows tax credits 
for medical expenses in excess 3% of net income and for charitable donations. 
Canada Pension Plan contributions, unemployment insurance premiums, uni- 
versity  tuition,  and  C$l,OOO  of  pension  income are  also creditable.  The 
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spousal, and dependent tax credits are given, and there are also some “vanish- 
ing” tax credits available to lower-income taxpayers. The tax credit rate is 
equal to the lowest tax rate (17% federal), except for charitable donations over 
C$250, which are credited at 29% federal. These credits are matched at  a 
corresponding rate under the provincial income tax systems, which also con- 
tain some province-specific tax credits. 
Canada has a dividend tax credit to provide relief from double taxation at 
the personal and corporate levels on dividends. The dividend tax credit of 
approximately 22% (federal) is available on taxable dividends (received divi- 
dends  grossed-up  by  one-quarter)  from  corporations  resident  in  Canada 
against personal income taxes payable on dividends in Canada. Since provin- 
cial taxes are applied on federal tax liabilities, this is effectively increased by 
a further 52-62%,  depending on the province, when provincial taxes are ap- 
plied. The dividend tax credit rate supposedly is set so that the system is inte- 
grated “on average.” However, it is underintegrated for dividends from a fully 
taxpaying  corporation and overintegrated on  dividends from nontaxpaying 
corporations. The implications of  a dividend tax credit in the context of  an 
open economy are discussed further in section 1.4. 
The Tax Rate Structure. Canada and the United States both have graduated 
income tax structures with three brackets. The top rate in the United States is 
nominally  28%  (federal),  although it  is  actually  33%  for incomes  above 
$74,850 (married, filing jointly in the 1989 tax year) until the advantages of 
the lower initial tax bracket and the personal exemptions have been recaptured 
(at around $200,000, depending on taxpayer circumstances). The rate struc- 
ture, including brackets, exemptions, and the standard deduction, is fully in- 
dexed to the previous year’s inflation rate. State income tax rates vary widely, 
but the top rate in many states is around 10%. Since the state income tax is 
deductible from federal income tax, the combined top marginal rate is about 
35% (nearly 40% in the phaseout bracket). For the purposes of cross-country 
comparison, we consider the state of New York, which has a top personal rate 
of  8.75%, yielding a combined top rate of around 34% (39% in the phaseout 
bracket)  .6 
In Canada, the highest marginal rate is 29%  (federal) on income above 
C$55,605 (1989 tax year) but there is also a “temporary” surtax of 4% (5.5% 
for high incomes). All provinces except Quebec set their income tax as some 
fraction of  the federal income tax owing. In Ontario, it was  52% in  1989, 
rising to 53%  in 1990. The highest gross-up occurs in Newfoundland, at 62%. 
There are also provincial surtaxes on high incomes (10% in Ontario). The 
combined top rate in Ontario (including federal and provincial surtaxes) in 
1989 was 47%. Thus, it is clear that even after Canadian tax reform, the high- 
6. In  some states, federal  income taxes are  also deductible from  state income taxes, so the 
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est marginal income tax rate in Canada remains substantially higher (at least 
8 percentage points in the case of Ontario versus New York) than that found 
in the United States. This reflects a higher average level of taxes on personal 
income in Canada, as revealed in tables 1 and 2. The tax structure is indexed 
in Canada as in the United States, but only by the excess of the previous year’s 
inflation over 3%. Therefore, there is some degree of bracket creep operating 
for taxpayers below the top bracket in Canada. 
Offsetting the higher Canadian tax rates to some extent are the higher social 
security taxes in the United States. In the United States, the Old-Age, Survi- 
vors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax is  15.3% for the employee and 
employer combined, to a maximum contribution of  around $7,000 (1990). 
The OASDI tax is deductible as a business expense for employers but is not 
deductible against income for employees. In  Canada, the combined Canada 
Pension Plan and unemployment insurance contributions (employee and em- 
ployer) are at 9.4%, up to a total of about C$3,000, but these taxes are deduc- 
tible to employers and creditable at 17% for employees. There are also payroll 
taxes (approximately 2% in Ontario) or compulsory hospital plan premia at 
the provincial level to fund public health insurance programs that exist in all 
provinces. In making these comparisons, it should be recognized that public 
pension and unemployment insurance contributions are viewed, to some ex- 
tent, as benefit taxes. To the extent that an  offsetting benefit is perceived, these 
taxes are less likely to act as a disincentive than general income taxes are. 
The other offsetting factor with respect to capital income is the partial inte- 
gration measure in Canada, as compared to the classical corporate income tax 
system in the United States. When the combined top corporate and personal 
tax rates on dividend income are compared between New York  and Ontario, 
taking into account the dividend tax credit, the rates are approximately equal 
(lower in Ontario if  the 33% rate is used for New  York).  The rate is clearly 
lower in Ontario if the capital income is earned in manufacturing and process- 
ing, where the corporate tax rate is lower. It should be kept in  mind, how- 
ever, that the integration measures are available only to resident Canadians. 
Moreover,  the  impact of  such measures may  not  be  those  expected (see 
section 1.4). 
Differences in the Corporate Income Tax Systems 
Differences between the Canadian and U.S. corporation income tax systems 
(CITs) are perhaps the most relevant for the purposes of harmonization, since 
capital is highly mobile between the two countries. Furthermore, many cor- 
porations are residents of both countries and can exercise some degree of dis- 
cretion as to where they take their income. 
The Tax Base. The CITs in both countries are similar in overall structure. Both 
are accrual taxes on what is essentially shareholders’ income accruing within 
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included in the tax base. In Canada, intercorporate dividends from domestic 
corporations are tax exempt. In the United States, the dividend tax exemption 
applies only to dividends from controlled domestic affiliates, with a 20% in- 
clusion for dividends from noncontrolled corporations. Three-quarters of re- 
alized capital gains are included in Canada, whereas there is full taxation of 
realized capital gains in the United States. 
Current expenses such as wages, fees, rents, and losses due to fire and theft 
are deductible as they  accrue.  Current expenses include employer payroll 
taxes and private pension plan and social insurance contributions. Interest on 
debt is expensed but may be capitalized in both countries. In  some cases in 
Canada (e.g., real estate development), interest capitalization is required. In 
the United States, state corporate taxes, local property taxes, and royalties are 
deductible, whereas in Canada only property taxes, including the provincial 
corporate capital taxes,  are deductible.  There is  a  fixed abatement  of  tax 
points for the provincial corporate income tax, and a resource allowance equal 
to 25% of net profit is given in lieu of a deduction for provincial royalty pay- 
ments and mining taxes. In the United States, there is a cost depletion allow- 
ance for large oil and gas firms and a percentage depletion allowance for small 
oil and gas firms and  mining.  Charitable donations are deductible in both 
countries within limits. In the United States, donations of appreciated capital 
property are deductible at assessed market value; in Canada the deduction is 
limited to the adjusted cost base. 
Some capital costs are effectively expensed.  In  Canada, there is  100% 
write-off for resource exploration and development expenses in  mining, ex- 
ploration expenses in oil and gas,  and  all R&D expenses except land and 
buildings. In the United States, there is 100% write-off for mining and small 
oil and gas producers, 70% for large oil and gas producers, with the remainder 
capitalized. These write-offs are not elective, unlike the CCA in Canada (see 
below). Also, in some cases the fast write-off cannot be used to create a net 
operating loss. In the United States, exploration and development expenses 
for mining must be amortized for calculating the alternative minimum tax. 
The tax depreciation provisions differ significantly between the two coun- 
tries. Perhaps most significantly, the Canadian CCA is an elective deduction, 
whereas the U. S. deduction is mandatory. The Canadian regulations set max- 
imum declining-balance recovery rates for around forty asset classes. In the 
United States, the postreform modified accelerated cost recovery system rates 
apply to eight recovery period classifications set out in the asset depreciation 
range classifications. On average, U.S. recovery rates are higher than in Can- 
ada (accelerated depreciation was reduced by less in the United States than in 
Canada under recent corporate tax reforms). Also, the United States allows 
the switch to straight-line depreciation when it becomes favorable to do so. 
On the other hand, the put-in-use rule in the United States is more effective 
than the pending Canadian rule, and the United States has half-year rules upon 
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rule. There are recapture provisions in Canada. Recapture in the United States 
is automatic, since capital gains are fully taxed. 
Another significant difference is in the costing of  inventory. The United 
States allows firms to choose between FIFO and the more favorable LIFO 
conventions. In Canada, FIFO is mandatory. Further, the partly compensating 
inventory deduction of 3% was abolished in Canadian tax reform, so there is 
no compensation for purely inflationary changes in inventory valuation. 
Both  countries allow  carryover for net  operating losses.  In  the  United 
States, they can be carried back three years and forward fifteen, while in Can- 
ada, the carryover is three and seven years, respectively. However, the elective 
CCA permits additional scope for loss carryover in Canada. 
Another major difference between the corporate tax systems is the impor- 
tance of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). In the United States, AMT in- 
come includes one-half of book profit, with the remainder based on taxable 
income adjusted to reduce various tax preferences. A significant factor is that 
foreign tax credits can be used to offset no more than 90%  of the AMT liabil- 
ity, so for firms subject to the AMT there may not be full relief from interna- 
tional double taxation. In Canada, there is no AMT for corporate income, but 
the recently introduced large-corporation capital tax is credited against cor- 
porate income surtaxes and acts as a minimum tax. The base of this alternative 
tax is unrelated to corporate income and therefore immune to erosion because 
of income shifting by transnational corporations. 
The Taz Rate Structure. In the United States, there is a graduated rate structure 
at the federal level. Nominally, the top rate is 34% for corporate income in 
excess of $75,000, but firms in the range of $100,000 to $335,000 pay 39%, 
as the benefits of  the lower rates on  corporate income below  $75,000 are 
phased out. Forty-five states and the District of Columbia levy a local corpo- 
rate income tax, and some follow the federal method of reporting income. The 
state tax rates are usually graduated and range from 1% to a high of  12% in 
Minnesota and Iowa. The major industrial states may have relatively low rates 
(2.5% in Illinois) or higher rates (9% in New York).  Since the state tax is 
deductible, the combined top rate is about 41% (45%  in the phaseout range) 
and about 40%  in New York. 
There are two main tax credits available to U.S. corporations-the  R&D 
incremental tax credit of 20%  on qualifying spending in excess of the average 
of the past three years, and the foreign tax credit (discussed in the next sec- 
tion). Also, there are some special investment tax credits for energy conser- 
vation investments and the like at the state level. 
In Canada, the combined corporate tax rates are slightly higher, except on 
income derived from manufacturing and processing. The basic federal rate is 
28%, with a lower rate of  23% on income derived from manufacturing and 
processing (when fully phased in  by  1991), plus a corporate surtax of  3%. 
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Canadian-controlled  private corporations.  All provinces levy a corporate in- 
come tax, basically using the federal definition of corporate income. The pro- 
vincial rates are higher than the state rates in the United States and are not 
deductible  from the federal tax. The Ontario basic rate is  15.5%, giving  a 
combined basic rate inclusive of the federal surtax of 44.3%. On income de- 
rived  from manufacturing  and processing, the Ontario rate is  14.5%, so the 
combined rate on this type of income (1991) is 38.2%. The top rate is higher 
in some provinces.  Overall, the rates are much closer to those in the United 
States than is the case for the personal income tax. 
There are three main tax credits available to corporations in Canada-the 
investment tax credit of  15% for qualifying investments in the Atlantic region, 
the R&D tax credit  of  20% (30% in Atlantic  Canada), and the foreign tax 
credit. 
1.3.3  Internal Income Tax Harmonization in the United States and Canada 
In both the United  States and Canada, the personal and corporate income 
taxes are co-occupied  by the federal government and the states or provinces. 
Differing amounts of harmonization  occur between the two levels of  govern- 
ment in the two countries. In Canada, harmonization exists to a high degree, 
largely owing  to the fact  that the existing  system evolved from a wartime 
situation in which the federal government  was the sole occupant of  income 
taxation  and  funded  provincial  expenditures through  transfers.  Starting in 
1962, the federal government began turning over income tax revenue-raising 
capacities  to the  provinces. At  the same time, it  offered the provinces  the 
opportunity  to join tax  collection  agreements with the federal government, 
under which the federal government collects taxes on behalf of the provinces. 
These tax collection agreements are still in effect and form the basis for har- 
monizing the corporate and personal income tax systems in Canada. 
Under the tax collection agreements, participating provinces agree to abide 
by the tax base used by the federal government but may set their own tax rates. 
In the case of the personal tax, the rate they choose is applied to federal taxes 
payable,  thereby  guaranteeing  that the federal rate structure applies to both 
levels of  government. For the corporate tax, provinces apply their tax rates to 
the federal tax base. As well, the federal government will administer provin- 
cial tax credits for a small fee, provided they are judged to be simple to admin- 
ister and do not  discriminate against residents of  other provinces  or distort 
investment decisions. The federal government for its part collects all taxes on 
behalf  of the agreeing provinces and pays over to the provinces assessed tax 
liabilities. The federal government bears the cost of bad debts but retains all 
interest earned on the funds. For the corporate tax, the provinces agree to a 
formula apportionment method for allocating revenues among provinces. The 
formula is a simple one: the share of  a firm’s taxable income accruing to a 
province equals the average of its share of  revenues of the firm and its share 
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All provinces except Quebec have signed a tax collection agreement with 
the federal government for the personal income tax, while all except Alberta, 
Ontario, and Quebec belong for the corporate income tax. Despite this lack of 
universal coverage, all provinces, agreeing or not, have virtually the same 
corporate income tax base  as the federal government and  follow the same 
allocation formula. The personal tax system for Quebec does diverge some- 
what from that in the rest of the provinces. Thus, there is a fairly high degree 
of  harmonization among income tax bases, the main differences being in the 
levels of tax rates. Even here the differences are not great, owing to the exten- 
sive system of  interprovincial fiscal equalization that exists in Canada. Pre- 
sumably the historical evolution of the system has had an important impact on 
the degree to which harmonization has been achieved and maintained. The 
fact that the system was operated by the federal government alone during the 
war meant that a fully harmonized system was the starting point. Once a uni- 
form system was in place, arbitrary deviations from it were unlikely to occur. 
Nevertheless, there are increasing signs of  strain and discontent among the 
provinces. The federal government retains unilateral control of the income tax 
bases and changes them from time to time on its own initiative. As the prov- 
inces come to occupy more and more of  the tax room, they naturally would 
like to have more and more influence on their own tax structures. The main 
way open for them to exercise this desire is to implement provincial tax credits 
of  various sorts. There has been a proliferation of  provincial tax credits and 
rebates administered through the agreements in recent years, and this has frag- 
mented the system somewhat. More significantly, the principle of maintaining 
a common base has been violated in three provinces with the introduction of 
flat-rate income taxes at the  personal  level alongside the ordinary income 
taxes. These are administered through the agreements. The basic legislation 
governing the agreements has remained unaltered since its inception. It may 
be reviewed and changed as the federal government enters the retail sales tax 
field and attempts to negotiate analogous agreements with the provinces for 
harmonization in this area. 
The Canadian case is somewhat interesting from a broader perspective, 
since it is similar in form to the system of  harmonization being proposed for 
the European Economic Community. We  return to the pros and cons of this 
type of harmonization in a later section of the paper. 
Income tax harmonization in the United States is much less structured than 
in  Canada. Indeed, it is virtually nonexistent, in the sense that there are no 
formal tax collection agreements and all states collect their income taxes sepa- 
rately from the federal government. This is the case despite the fact that the 
Federal-State Tax  Collection Act of  1972 empowers the federal government 
to enter into agreements with the states not unlike those that exist in Canada. 
No  states have chosen to do so. The implicit harmonization that does exist 
involves states voluntarily adopting some aspects of the federal tax structure, 
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many  local governments also levy an income tax at the personal level, while 
some states levy none. Only forty states levy a general personal income tax, 
while three others levy a tax on capital income only. As well, local income 
taxes are used by  many local governments in eleven states. 
The nature of  state personal income taxes and their relation to the federal 
tax differ widely over states. Four states actually collect personal taxes as a 
percentage of federal tax liabilities (as in Canada). Eight states adopt the fed- 
eral tax base as the state tax base but choose their own rate structures. Both of 
these systems obviously reduce compliance and collection costs for the states 
and the taxpayers. However, the states still maintain their own independent 
collection and audit machinery. Twenty-six states use the same definition of 
gross income as the federal government, but then apply their own systems of 
deductions and exemptions as well as tax structure. Finally, six states set their 
entire tax structures essentially independently of the federal government.’ 
The other difference between the Canadian and U.S. systems of  personal 
taxation is that, whereas the Canadian tax system is based on the residency 
principle as regards income earned in different provinces, the U.S. system 
typically involves personal taxation at source. That is, states usually tax all 
income earned in the states by residents and nonresidents alike and then pro- 
vide credits for tax paid in other jurisdictions.  (Many states also provide a 
deduction for taxes paid at the federal level.) However, not all states apply the 
same rules,  so there may be double taxation of  personal income, or none, 
depending on the  states involved. In any case, the  system is considerably 
more complex than the Canadian one. 
Forty-five of the states also levy a corporation income tax. All collect their 
own, and only six adopt the federal corporate tax  base. As  well, different 
states use different methods for allocating taxes to their jurisdictions. Most 
states use formula apportionment to do so, with the formulas typically involv- 
ing proportions of  sales, payroll, and property. Not  all states use the three 
factors with equal rates. For example, some states give larger weight to sales, 
especially states for which sales are large compared with production. As with 
the personal tax, the possibility exists for double or under taxation of  some 
sources of  income.  Also, because of  the absence of  a system of  interstate 
fiscal redistribution, tax  rate differentials may be higher across states than 
across provinces. 
1.3.4  Taxation of Cross-Border Income Flows 
While the United States and Canada have varying degrees of  internal tax 
harmonization, there are no official arrangements for harmonizing their na- 
tional tax  systems, except through the provisions of  the Canada-U.S. Tax 
Convention (1980), henceforth referred to as “the treaty.” The tax laws in each 
7. A more detailed analysis of  tax rate differences across states and provinces may be found in 
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country contain provisions determining whether a taxpayer is resident or not 
and provisions determining whether a particular income receipt is from a do- 
mestic source or not (“source rules”). These provisions are chosen indepen- 
dently in each country, with tax treaty provisions taking precedence over them 
in the event of a conflict, but only to the extent of the conflict. 
Both Canada and the United States adopt the same general conventions re- 
garding cross-border income flows. Residents (persons and corporations) in 
each country are taxed on the basis of their world income (i.e., domestic and 
foreign source income),  while nonresidents are taxed only on the basis of 
income originating in the country (i.e., source income only). In Canada, res- 
idence of persons is determined mainly on the basis of the taxpayer living in 
the country, although persons may be “deemed residents” when some perma- 
nent attachment exists, even if they are not physically residing in the country. 
Corporations are considered resident if they were incorporated in Canada. The 
United States taxes its citizens on their world income irrespective of  where 
they reside, although there is a $70,000 exclusion of  foreign earned income 
for qualifying individuals residing abroad. Corporations are residents of  the 
United States if incorporated there. 
Source rules apply in both countries, but are more developed in the United 
States. Generally, income is considered to be from a domestic source if  it is 
income derived from employment within the country, business income from 
“carrying on business” in the country (or “effectively connected” within the 
United States), rent and royalties from real property located within the coun- 
try,  interest from a domestic payer, or dividends from a firm incorporated 
within the country. Capital gains are considered domestic source only if they 
result from the disposition of real estate. Both countries exempt interest paid 
by  domestic governments (the United States also exempts interest paid by 
U.S. chartered banks). Social insurance payments from the domestic govern- 
ment are also considered as domestic source income. In determining business 
income, expenses are deductible, but in the United States regulations govern- 
ing the allocation of expenses apply where the taxpayer has both domestic and 
foreign source income. Among the most important of  these regulations are 
those governing the allocations of  interest and R&D (or other intangibles) 
expenses. In Canada, a thin-capitalization rule puts an  upper bound on interest 
expenses, while in the United States interest expenses are allocated according 
to asset shares by location. In the United States, R&D expenses are allocated 
partly on the basis of where the research took place and partly on the basis of 
the  location  of  sales.  Canada allows  for  deductions for R&D  conducted 
abroad if “related to Canadian business .” 
The  taxation  of  domestic  source income of  nonresidents  is  essentially 
schedular in both countries. Employment income is taxed in the same way as 
it would be taxed in the hands of  a resident, but with a more limited set of 
deductions, exemptions, or credits. Likewise, business income is taxed in the 
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applicable. Gross-basis-type (i.e., no deductions) taxes are imposed by  both 
countries on interest, dividends, royalties, and fees paid to nonresidents. The 
basic tax  rate  is 30% in the U.S.  and  25%  in  Canada, but  these rates are 
reduced by treaty. These taxes are enforced by withholding by the payer. Both 
countries have  branch profit taxes at the same rate applying to nonretained 
earnings of branch firms (which replicate the dividend withholding taxes ap- 
plying to dividend repatriations from subsidiaries). 
The tax codes of both countries contain provisions designed to alleviate the 
double taxation of cross-border income flows, although the actual provisions 
differ. The U.S. allows a foreign tax credit up to the domestic tax liability for 
income-type taxes levied on foreign source income in the source country. A 
“deemed-paid’’ credit is allowed against U.S.  corporation income taxes for 
foreign corporation income taxes  paid  by  a controlled subsidiary (10% or 
more share ownership). In general, to be creditable, the foreign taxes must be 
net income taxes and similar to the U.S. taxes against which they are credited, 
although gross-basis withholding taxes are creditable under special rules. Re- 
source royalty type taxes are explicitly excluded. Foreign tax credits may be 
extended to dissimilar foreign taxes under treaty. Where foreign tax credits are 
not applicable, a deduction can be taken. The foreign tax credit is subject to 
an overall limitation equal to the ratio of foreign source income to world in- 
come times the U.S. tax liability and also to ten different “basket” limitations 
according to type of  income (active, passive, dividend, interest, etc.). From 
1986 on, foreign earnings and taxes have been calculated on a cumulative 
basis in determining the foreign tax credit limitation. This is intended to pre- 
vent the acceleration of  foreign tax credit eligibility through the use of  the 
“rhythm method” of repatriation, which is possible when foreign depreciation 
deductions are optional, as in Canada. 
In  contrast, Canada employs a mixed system of  exemptions, credits, and 
deductions to alleviate double taxation. Dividends paid out of  “exempt sur- 
plus” (essentially the active business income of  controlled foreign affiliates 
located in  listed-mainly  tax treaty-countries  where Canadian ownership 
exceeds 50% or more) are exempt from the Canadian corporation income tax, 
while foreign tax credits of  foreign corporation income taxes and gross-basis 
withholding taxes up to the Canadian corporation income tax liability are per- 
mitted against dividends received from foreign corporations in which the Ca- 
nadian parent has ownership of  10%-50%.  Foreign tax credits against Cana- 
dian personal income taxes are also allowed for personal income taxes and 
withholding taxes levied in the source country. Again, where foreign tax cred- 
its are not applicable, deductions of  foreign taxes paid are usually allowed. 
The overall limitation is calculated in the same way as for the United States, 
although there are only two “basket” limitations-“business”  and “nonbusi- 
ness” income. 
Canada and the United States both adopt a “separate accounting” approach 
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aries. This implies two things. First, foreign source income is not subject to 
taxation (if at all) in the residence country until it is received by the parent 
(“repatriated”). Thus, the parent-country taxes (if applicable) are said to be 
“deferred.” Second, scope is opened for international tax planning by the mul- 
tinational corporation because of  its ability to manipulate the source of  in- 
come. The tax laws in both countries contain provisions designed to prevent 
international tax  avoidance made  possible by  the  separate accounting  ap- 
proach coupled with the existence of “tax havens .” These provisions take two 
forms: transfer pricing regulations enforcing arm’s length prices on transac- 
tions between related corporations and provisions requiring what is effectively 
unitary tax treatment for passive income and other “tainted forms” accruing 
to controlled affiliates of  resident corporations. Section 482 of the U.S. tax 
code allows the authorities to scrutinize transactions between related corpora- 
tions and impute arm’s length prices where feasible or attribute “commensur- 
ate income” to intangibles. Section 69(3) of  the Canadian Income Tax  Act 
allows  the  authorities to  deem payments received from  nonresidents that 
would have been reasonable in an arm’s length transaction when inadequate 
compensation is found. 
Passive income of  controlled personal corporations and sales and service 
income passing between controlled subsidiaries in other countries is included 
in the current income of the U.S. parent under the Subpart F provisions (with 
a corresponding foreign tax credit and subsequent tax-free disposition). The 
equivalent Canadian provision is the so-called FAPI (foreign accrual property 
income) rule,  which requires income from property and  business  income, 
other than from active business of a controlled foreign affiliate, to be included 
in the income of the Canadian parent. There is nothing equivalent under FAPI 
to the U.S. inclusion of sales and service income among related foreign affili- 
ates, although income from services that would otherwise be active business 
income will be  included in  FAPI  if the income is charged as a deductible 
expense to the controlling parent (or in some cases to an unrelated party). 
Many of  the above provisions are modified under the Canadian-U.S. tax 
treaty. The treaty contains “tie-breaker” provisions for determining residence 
in the case of dual residence persons and corporations. An important one is 
that  a corporation resident  in Canada may  be  taxed only on its Canadian 
source income (i.e., treated as a nonresident) if it was incorporated earlier in 
the United States. Both countries also agree to determining the source of busi- 
ness income on  the basis of  it being attributable to a “permanent establish- 
ment.” There are also limits on gross-basis withholding tax rates. Nonresident 
withholding taxes on royalties, fees, and dividends paid to related corpora- 
tions in the other country are limited to a maximum of  10%. A maximum 
withholding rate of  15% applies to interest and to dividends paid to unrelated 
corporations in the other country. Also, the branch profits tax rate is limited to 
a maximum of  10% in the case of  branches of  corporations resident in the 
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resident of the other are subject to a maximum withholding tax of  15% by the 
source country, to the extent that such income would be included in taxable 
income of residents of that country. 
The tax treaty also extends certain deductions and exemptions available to 
resident  persons  to nationals  of  the other country,  prohibits  discriminatory 
taxation  of the  other country’s persons and corporations,  mandates double- 
taxation relief through credits and exemptions, and authorizes competent au- 
thorities to alleviate individual cases of double taxation. The latter may arise 
through ex-post application of the transfer pricing regulations of each country. 
1.4  General Analysis of Income Tax Harmonization between 
Countries 
In this section we examine some general issues associated with income tax 
harmonization.  Primarily we are concerned with how similar the income tax 
structures must be for countries whose economies are highly integrated, and 
the extent to which the need for similarity limits the pursuit of  national  tax 
policy objectives. Our discussion will be restricted  to the case of  two coun- 
tries, though similar principles apply more generally. In the next section, we 
investigate in more detail the constraints imposed on tax-policy making in an 
individual economy. We begin here with a preliminary discussion of the way 
pressures for harmonization impinge on tax policy objectives. 
1.4.1 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are several major objectives of tax 
policy.  First and foremost is the revenue  objective.  A country.’s tax system 
must  yield  a predictable  and  stable  source of  revenue  sufficient to finance 
planned  government  spending.  In particular, the revenue base  must be pro- 
tected  from widespread erosion due to tax avoidance and the shifting of the 
tax base into low-tax jurisdictions.  Second, there is the distribution objective. 
The burden of the tax revenue obtained should be distributed across the pop- 
ulation in some desired manner. While the distributive objective may be based 
on principles of vertical equity across income groups,  regional  factors also 
play an important role, especially in Canada. A third objective is to minimize 
the economic cost or burden of raising the desired level of revenue. This re- 
quires both administrative efficiency, meaning that the collection and compli- 
ance costs of  obtaining the revenue are minimized, and economic efficiency, 
meaning that the deadweight costs of the distortions imposed by the tax sys- 
tem on the allocation of the economy’s productive resources among compet- 
ing uses are minimized. Finally, for our purposes, there is the industrial policy 
objective, whereby the government seeks to use the tax system to reallocate 
production to achieve noneconomic goals. Again, an important element here 
may be regional policy. Obviously, this last objective will usually conflict with 
the neutrality objective. Typically these objectives will conflict with one an- 
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other; a fully efficient tax system will not be equitable, nor will it be adminis- 
tratively feasible. Regional policy objectives will conflict directly with effi- 
ciency. Because of this, a judgment must be made about the optimal way  to 
trade off  these objectives, and this will differ from country to country. 
While Canada and the United States undoubtedly share the broad objectives 
outlined above, section 1.3 indicated that there are important differences be- 
tween the two countries. The combined levels of governments raise a propor- 
tionally larger amount of revenue in Canada than in the United States. Also, 
the distributional objectives of  tax policy appear to be pursued more vigor- 
ously in Canada, both in terms of vertical redistribution and regional redistri- 
bution. The result is substantially higher top marginal tax rates in Canada than 
in the United States. The regional objectives of  tax policy also contribute to 
the (perhaps) greater extent of production non-neutralities in the Canadian tax 
structure, since these are partly achieved by  region-specific investment tax 
credits. Also, Canada continues to maintain a preferential corporate tax rate 
on  corporations engaged in  manufacturing and processing activities. On the 
other hand, the personal income tax in Canada appears to contain fewer con- 
sumption non-neutralities than that of the United States, mainly because mort- 
gage interest and lower-level government taxes are not deductible, while most 
fringe benefits and transfer payments are included in taxable income. 
The implications of economic integration for the tax policy choices made 
by a government may be significant. For one thing, the free flow of goods and 
factors across international borders may alter the desirability of certain objec- 
tives. For example, distributive objectives that require a high marginal tax rate 
on upper-income persons may be unattractive if labor markets for skilled and 
entrepreneurial persons are integrated  across international borders, so that 
such individuals may leave the country in search of lower tax rates. Similarly, 
the taxation of  capital income may be tempered by  the mobility of  capital 
between jurisdictions. In addition, the best method of  achieving a policy ob- 
jective may be altered by economic integration. Where it is possible, the bur- 
den of taxation on the population of  an individual country can be reduced by 
actions that attempt to shift the burden to foreigners. While these beggar-thy- 
neighbor policies may appear efficient from the individual perspective of  a 
country, they are not likely to be so from the collective perspective of  all of 
the  countries  involved.  Even  when  such  policies  are  excluded,  the  best 
method of  achieving a policy objective may be altered by openness. For ex- 
ample, attempts to pursue industrial policy objectives through corporate tax 
incentives may be ineffective if multinational corporations are very important 
in the production sector and tax relief simply transfers tax revenue to foreign 
treasuries rather than provides incentives for the taxpayer. Instead, a direct 
subsidy that does not alter the foreign tax liability of the corporation may be a 
more effective instrument. Similarly, if high-income persons are very mobile 
internationally while low-income persons are not, the negative income tax 
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relief may  be less desirable than income maintenance programs targeted on 
the (immobile) poor through the use of high “claw-back” rates. 
Economic theory might suggest that the objectives of tax policy could best 
be achieved through direct taxes on persons or households, since the ultimate 
burden of  all taxes falls on them in any case. The optimal tax literature has 
shown that if  certain separability conditions are satisfied, indirect taxation is 
unnecessary. Given that these conditions are not unreasonable ones and that, 
in  any case, we  do not know  in  which way  preferences actually vary from 
them, there is not a strong efficiency or equity argument for having a separate 
indirect tax system. The personal income tax would presumably be on a resi- 
dence basis. The chosen base could be either consumption or income or, pos- 
sibly, some hybrid. The residence income tax rate structure could be chosen 
to achieve domestic distribution objectives if persons are immobile across in- 
ternational borders. Otherwise, the caveats mentioned above apply. 
Unfortunately, things are not so simple outside the world of  pure theory. 
There are several reasons why governments may want to supplement the per- 
sonal income tax with other forms of taxes. Direct taxes on corporate income 
fulfill several objectives. First, if accruing income to capital is to be included 
in the personal tax base, a corporation income tax is more or less necessary as 
a “withholding” tax  against undistributed  income accruing to shareholders 
within corporations. Second, it may be desirable to tax differentially pure prof- 
its or rents, where they exist. This can be done with a business income tax of 
correct design or, in the case of resource properties, by auctioning off property 
rights or levying severance taxes (or equivalently, charging royalties). Such 
taxes may be sector-specific, but need not be restricted to corporations. They 
might also be origin-based rather than residence-based. Another reason for 
levying a corporation income tax (and for similar provisions applying to busi- 
ness income of unincorporated businesses under the personal tax) is that such 
a tax is most useful as an instrument of industrial policy, since it applies at the 
level of the producer. Again, this objective suggests that an origin-type busi- 
ness income tax would be desirable if it were possible. Finally, a country that 
is host to a substantial amount of foreign-owned capital may wish to levy such 
a tax simply to capture revenue that would otherwise accrue to foreign trea- 
suries. This is the case when the home country offers a foreign tax credit for 
corporation income taxes paid in the host country by  the subsidiaries of  its 
domestic corporations. Of  course, this objective alone requires only that the 
host country tax income accruing to foreign-owned capital and not domesti- 
cally owned capital. But singling out foreign capital would appear discrimi- 
natory and is likely to be ineligible for the foreign tax credit offered by  the 
home country. For that reason, the corporate tax system would likely have to 
apply identically to both domestic and foreign-owned firms. Its design must 
take account of all the objectives of corporate taxation in a single tax system. 
We  return in the next section to the specifics of  the design of  a corporate tax 
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In  addition to direct taxation, governments also tend to levy broad-based 
indirect sales taxes. Such taxes are widely used by  governments around the 
world, including state and provincial governments in the United States and 
Canada and the Canadian federal government. From a purely economic per- 
spective, the effect of  broad-based indirect taxes can be replicated by  direct 
taxes. For example, as Shibata (1967) showed in his pioneering work on tax 
harmonization, destination-based general sales taxes on consumption are ul- 
timately equivalent to residence-based direct taxes on consumption. Similarly, 
direct taxes on income are equivalent to sales taxes on consumption and net 
investment. Thus, despite popular arguments to the effect that destination- 
based sales taxes are useful because they avoid imposing barriers to trade, 
they are essentially redundant from a purely economic point of view. 
Nonetheless, there is a compelling reason based on tax avoidance and eva- 
sion for a government to levy a broad-based sales tax in addition to a direct 
tax. Income that goes untaxed under the direct tax system due to avoidance or 
evasion can be taxed as it is spent by  the means of broad-based sales taxes. 
Furthermore, the higher the personal income tax rate, the greater is the incen- 
tive to evade. This may be particularly important if  residents of the country 
can “hide” accruing income by  investing abroad. The existence of a general 
sales tax both brings the expenditures from evaded income into the tax net and 
lowers the incentive to evade by lowering the level of direct taxes. Of course, 
this may be at the expense of other (equity) objectives. 
Two  major economic differences between broad-based direct and broad- 
based indirect taxes are that the former are more commonly levied on income 
(though hardly on a comprehensive basis) while the latter are typically levied 
on consumption, and that direct tax rates can be made taxpayer-specific and 
therefore can be chosen in accordance with ability to pay while the latter are 
levied on transactions and are therefore “anonymous” (i.e., must be levied at 
the same rate on all taxpayers regardless of ability to pay). The first distinction 
seems artificial, since direct taxes can be levied on consumption by  allowing 
saving to be deducted, while indirect taxes can be levied on an income basis 
by including in the tax base the sale of capital goods (net of depreciation) to 
producers. The second distinction seems more important, in that direct taxes 
appear to be better suited for achieving a government’s distributional objec- 
tive.  Although the indirect tax  could achieve some types of  redistribution 
through the use of differentiated tax rates across commodities, there is not a 
great economic case for so doing, and it may prove to be a “blunt instrument” 
in use. 
Despite the possible equivalences between direct and indirect taxes, a major 
consideration from the Canadian perspective is that the U.S. foreign tax credit 
is allowed for income taxes only and explicitly excludes indirect taxes. Thus, 
even if the objectives of Canadian governments could be achieved with indi- 
rect taxation, there are good revenue reasons for relying on income taxes to 
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presence of foreign-owned capital. In the remainder of  this paper, we  will 
focus on harmonization problems solely as they relate to income taxation. 
1.4.2  Noncooperative Harmonization: How Similar Must the 
Tax Systems Be? 
It is commonly thought that the pressures for tax harmonization resulting 
from economic integration inevitably lead to highly similar tax structures. Yet 
the income tax systems of the United States and Canada, and even the income 
tax systems of different states in the United States, do differ from one another 
in significant ways. The point is that economic integration does not necessar- 
ily force uniformity in fiscal systems. This is the case for several reasons. 
First, to the extent that tax  differences are matched by  fiscal benefit differ- 
ences, there is no incentive for factors to move unless the benefits can be 
retained while the taxes are reduced by  such movements. This is particularly 
true for persons who are likely to make fiscally induced migration decisions, 
not on the basis of their marginal tax rates or even their average tax rates, but 
rather on the basis of their appraisal of the net fiscal surplus (positive or neg- 
ative) associated with living in a taxing (and spending!)  jurisdiction. 
A second reason why different income tax  structures can be sustained is 
that there is considerable immobility of  persons across international borders. 
Thus a government can levy its income tax on the world income of its taxpay- 
ers as determined by  residence. Except for any differences in the ability to 
evade taxes on foreign and domestic income, the tax system exhibits “factor 
export neutrality,” and there is no incentive for taxpayers to locate their factors 
on the basis of differing tax systems between countries, because they are sub- 
ject to the same domestic taxes on all income. By  the same token, because 
labor is free to migrate across jurisdictions within a country, personal tax sys- 
tems should be less diverse within a federation than across countries, though 
even here, different tax levels may be offset by different levels of benefit from 
expenditures. 
Third, even if a factor is taxed on the basis of the source of  its income and 
even if  it is perfectly mobile between different tax jurisdictions, different tax 
rates can still be imposed in different jurisdictions-they  just may not have 
effects intended. Different tax rates can be imposed at source on the income of 
an internationally mobile factor if the before-tax factor return compensates for 
the tax differential. What is altered here is not the ability of a country to set a 
different tax rate, but the incentive for it to do so. Thus, for example, Canada 
(or a U.S. state) can differentially tax  income to capital, say by  levying a 
higher corporate tax rate, but the before-tax return to such capital must rise to 
compensate. Thus, if the purpose of the difference is to place a higher tax on 
owners of  capital, the tax difference does not achieve its objective, despite 
its being fiscally possible, because the tax is shifted to noncapital (and non- 
internationally mobile) factors. Only if the before-tax return cannot change, 
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would the country or state perceive itself as being forced into fiscal uniformity 
with the other. The point here is that the pressures for uniformity should be 
understood in terms of the way they alter the desirability to governments of 
choosing similar tax systems as much as the extent to which they are forced to 
do so. 
Of course, the return to a highly mobile factor can rise so as to compensate 
for a jurisdictional tax difference only to the extent that returns to other im- 
mobile factors can fall. We  are talking about real returns here, so returns can 
fall as a result of output prices in the country rising. Even in the case of traded 
goods for which world prices are fixed, domestic money prices and the ex- 
change rate can rise while the money prices of immobile factors remain fixed 
so real returns decline. If the monetary authority resists pressure for deprecia- 
tion, the price of  nontraded goods can rise, shifting the burden to domestic 
consumers of  such goods who own immobile factors. Thus there are several 
channels through which differential taxation of the income to mobile factors 
can be achieved. 
The above discussion suggests the extent to which economic integration 
forces harmonization on the countries involved. As long as persons remain 
relatively immobile across the border, the residence-based personal income 
tax systems can be quite differentiated. We  see this to be the case between the 
United States and Canada at the present time, and there is little reason to think 
that these differences cannot continue. However, one probable pressure for 
harmonization that is important on the personal income tax side is the pressure 
on Canada to keep the average tax rate on high-income persons from increas- 
ing any more relative to those that prevail in the United States. 
Similarly,  differences  in  benefit-related  taxes,  such  as  social insurance 
taxes, levied on a residence basis, are unlikely to pose problems of  dishar- 
mony. Even where imposed on employers, such taxes are ultimately borne by 
households who, on average, enjoy equivalent value in benefits. It seems rea- 
sonable, however, that it would not be possible to try to “make the foreigner 
pay” by levying such taxes on foreign-owned capital income. 
If pressures for uniformity exist anywhere, it is almost certainly with re- 
spect to corporation income taxes. The residence of a corporation is far more 
flexible than that of persons. As a result, corporation income taxes are likely 
to be more like source taxes. Since the source of income can be manipulated 
by  the corporation, both  in actuality and according to accounting records, 
differences in the corporate tax systems are likely to give rise to considerable 
cross-border tax shifting. 
Indeed, the pressures for uniformity in corporation income taxes should be 
greater as a result of  the  1986 reforms in the United States  Prior to these 
reforms, a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. multinational could utilize elective 
deductions such as the CCA so as to arrange to pay  more Canadian corpora- 
tion income taxes in years when repatriations of dividends to the U.S. parent 
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harmonization  pressures  served mainly to equalize  average  corporation tax 
rates, but not necessarily statutory tax rates. A higher statutory rate could be 
offset by more generous deductions, since those deductions could be taken in 
years when dividends were not repatriated. As long as the average corporation 
income tax in Canada did not exceed the U.S. rate, the Canadian corporation 
income taxes could be fully credited, even though the deemed-paid corpora- 
tion  income taxes in  Canada  were (and still are) determined using  a broad 
U.S. definition of taxable income that does not allow for the generous deduc- 
tions in the host country. The method of calculating the deemed-paid corpo- 
ration taxes in the host country was changed by the United States in 1986 to 
preclude widespread use of the rhythm method. As a result, higher statutory 
tax rates in Canada are likely to result in “excess” foreign tax credits for sub- 
sidiaries of U.S. multinationals.  With excess foreign tax credits there is an 
enormous tax incentive for the multinational corporation to shift income from 
Canada to the United States. Thus, there will be great pressure for Canada to 
keep statutory corporate tax rates close to U.S. levels.8 
There is also an important way in which the pressures to harmonize corpo- 
ration income tax rates feed back on the personal income tax system. As men- 
tioned, an important function of the corporation income tax is to act as a with- 
holding tax for the personal income tax. It is no accident that the corporation 
income tax rate  in both  countries  is approximately the same as the highest 
personal rate. If this were not the case, there could be widespread tax avoid- 
ance through corporate retentions. Thus, pressures to keep the Canadian cor- 
poration income tax rate no greater than the U.S. rate add to the pressures to 
keep the highest personal tax rate no higher as well. 
The main conclusion we can draw here is that in the absence of high mobil- 
ity of persons across the Canada-U. S. border, both countries should be able to 
pursue a fair amount of independent tax policy with respect to residence-based 
taxes. Source-based taxes on the income of highly mobile factors are another 
matter. Existing arrangements are likely to force a fair amount of uniformity, 
perhaps to the detriment of  each country’s ability to pursue its own tax policy 
objectives. 
However, the corporation  income tax need not be the source-based  tax it 
has become. To convert it back into a residence-based tax may require modi- 
fication of existing tax treaty arrangements. The main feature of the corpora- 
tion  income tax that  makes  it a source-based tax  is the  provisions used  to 
relieve double taxation. In particular, home countries have offered tax credits 
on taxes paid abroad by their corporations. Consider the following alternative 
residence-based corporation income tax system, in which no foreign tax credit 
is offered. In this hypothetical scenario, the host-country corporation income 
tax is credited when distributions are made to foreigners. That is, dividends 
8. For a complete discussion of how the deemed-paid corporation income tax is calculated and 
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paid to nonresident owners are deducted from the corporate tax base. (Mea- 
sures would have to be taken to prevent credits from being given to domestic- 
owned foreign “shell” corporations, if  a classical separate-entity corporation 
income tax arrangement is desired with respect to domestic residents. If  an 
imputation system is desired, dividends paid to domestic shareholders would 
be deductible from the corporate tax base as well.) Under this system, the 
local corporation tax is eliminated as far as the foreigners are concerned. If 
the foreign recipients are corporations, the income may then be  subject to 
corporation income taxes in the home country. In this scenario, the corpora- 
tion income tax is designed exactly like the personal income tax: it applies to 
resident recipients only (at least once the income is distributed). No double 
taxation occurs, and no double-taxation relief measures are needed. 
In the absence of the foreign tax credit provision by  the capital-exporting 
country, there is little cost to the host country from implementing such an 
arrangement, assuming that it has no market power in capital markets. With- 
out a foreign tax credit, the cost of capital is increased to the capital-importing 
country by  the amount of its corporation income tax, so eliminating the cor- 
poration tax  on income distributed to  foreign shareholders has distributive 
consequences only within the host country. All countries in the world would 
have to eliminate the foreign tax credit for this residence-based corporate tax 
system to be feasible. If  the capital-exporting country allows a foreign tax 
credit for host-country corporation taxes paid, the capital-importing country 
would be silly to credit its own corporation income tax to foreigners, at least 
up to the level that is eligible for the foreign tax credit abroad. The elimination 
of the host-country corporation tax on income to foreigners will not lower its 
cost of capital, because the tax is paid in the home country anyway: it simply 
transfers the revenue to the home country. 
Thus, if  the desired corporation income tax rates are the same in the two 
countries, the foreign tax credit simply acts as a lump-sum transfer from the 
capital-exporting country to the capital-importing country, and no harmoni- 
zation problems occur. The difficulty arises if  the countries want to impose 
different tax rates. This would pose no problem if the differential part of  the 
tax rate could be made residence-based. For example, if the capital-importing 
country wants to impose a higher corporate tax rate, no problems would occur 
if it credited the excess tax on distributions to foreigners. This would allow it 
to collect the revenue transfer from the capital-exporting country and follow 
an independent tax policy. It would also be complex and appear discrimina- 
tory if distribution credits were given only to foreigners or if distribution cred- 
its for the full corporation tax were given to domestics (i.e., an integrated 
domestic system) with partial credits to  foreigner^.^ This topic is developed 
further in section 1.5. 
9. Of course, the existing tax system in Canada, which gives a dividend tax credit to domestic 
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1.4.3  Spillovers in Determining Tax Rates 
As long as some income taxes in a country  are imposed on the basis of 
source or as long as there is some degree of mobility of persons across inter- 
national borders, the setting of tax policy instruments in a country will involve 
spillovers into other countries.  As a result, the independent (i.e., noncooper- 
ative) setting of tax policies in different countries may fail to achieve objec- 
tives that could be achieved if the countries were to coordinate (i.e., coopera- 
tively harmonize) the setting of their tax policies. We  illustrate this point in 
terms of the objective of taxing different activities in a manner that is econom- 
ically efficient. 
When the government of a country sets its tax policy instruments indepen- 
dently, it is unlikely to take account of any benefits or costs it imposes on the 
other countries with which it trades. Spillovers may arise through changes in 
external prices (the terms-of-trade effects that are analyzed extensively in the 
trade literature) or through the shifting of economic activity, actual or by ac- 
counting measures, between jurisdictions.  In this section, we argue that such 
spillovers are likely to lead to tax rates imposed on the income of internation- 
ally mobile factors being too low rather than too high. Ironically, much of the 
tax harmonization  literature focuses more concern on the danger of double 
taxation or discriminatorily high tax rates on cross-border income flows than 
on tax rates that are too low (except for the problem of outright tax avoidance 
through the use of tax havens). 
The argument is developed in figure  1.1, where the domestic supply of an 
internationally mobile factor F  to domestic production uses is given by the 
upward sloping supply curve labeled S. The supply curve S is drawn for given 
tax rates abroad. For simplicity, it is assumed that S is not perfectly elastic and 
that the  before-tax return  to the factor in domestic use is fixed at W,.  The 
return  to the factor is taxed at rate t so the after-tax return  to the factor in 
domestic use is W,( 1 - t)  and tax revenue abcd is collected. 
Consider now the domestic government’s decision as to whether to raise the 
tax rate on this type of factor income. If  it raises the tax rate marginally, do- 
mestic tax revenue will rise by the rectangle c&  (the increase in the tax rate 
cg times the amount of the factor still employed in domestic use cf)  and fall 
by the rectangle ebdf (the preexisting tax rate ef times the amount of the factor 
that leaves domestic taxable uses eb).  The latter is approximately equal to the 
area ebdh. Obviously, in order for the government to want to raise the tax rate, 
the area of cfllg must exceed ebdf. If the quantity of the factor leaving domes- 
tic employment (eb)  goes into nontaxable uses (household production or lei- 
sure),  the  area ebdf  (or ebdh) will also be  the  marginal “deadweight loss” 
incurred by raising the tax rate on income to factor E  Taxes would be  set 
optimally (from an economic efficiency perspective)  when revenue-increase 
rectangles (like cfhg) are the same multiple of the marginal deadweight-loss 
rectangles (like ebdh) across all factors of production. 
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Fig. 1.1  Spillovers in the taxation of a mobile factor F 
tax jurisdiction, which maintains the lower tax rate on its income. In this case 
the rectangle ebdf is not a deadweight loss to the world as a whole. Rather it 
is an increase in the tax revenue of the other country, which does not increase 
its tax rate on E But the domestic economy in deciding on whether to raise the 
tax rate ignores the revenue increase in the other jurisdiction. It treats the loss 
of  ebdf in the same way as it would if the factor escaped to untaxed uses. If 
the factor is in fixed supply to taxable uses in all jurisdictions, it could be a 
good thing to tax it from an efficiency perspective. But high factor mobility 
between tax jurisdictions is likely to make F  appear a bad candidate to the 
individual country. Another factor of  production which is immobile across 
international borders, but which has a less elastic supply curve to domestic 
taxable uses (the alternative use being untaxable), appears to be more attrac- 
tive to tax from the point of view of the individual country. This is the case 
even though from the perspective of all countries combined, it may not be a 
good factor to tax at a higher rate. 
What is being described here is the potential inefficiency of  “tax competi- 
tion” where a particular form of  income is highly mobile between two tax 
jurisdictions. In the extreme case, a factor may be in perfectly elastic supply 
to each country but in perfectly inelastic supply to all countries combined. 
Bertrand-type competition in tax rates may eliminate the taxation of  such a 
factor, desirable as it may be from a world perspective. Moreover, tax com- 
petition does not require that the factor actually be internationally mobile in a 
physical sense. Instead, income to that factor may simply be moved across 
borders to seek the lowest tax rate by the accounting procedures of multina- 
tional firms. 
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independently to end up taxing the income of a factor too much, as long as all 
countries take the tax rates in the other countries as given and countries do not 
perceive market power in the world markets for mobile factors. In order for a 
country acting independently  to set a tax rate on a factor too high from the 
world  perspective,  the area of rectangle  ebdf in figure  1.1 must be smaller 
than the marginal deadweight loss imposed on the two countries combined. 
Unless  there  is some unusual  complementarity between  factor F  and taxed 
factors in the other country, this does not seem likely to occur. The individual 
country  will have an incentive to tax a factor’s income at a compensatingly 
lower rate if the other country taxes it at a higher rate, assuming each country 
takes the others’ tax rates as given.  If, however,  one country is a strategic 
leader in setting its tax rates, it may tax a factor at too high a rate (from the 
point of view of  world efficiency) because it recognizes that the other country 
will reduce its tax rate (partially) on the factor, thus affecting a revenue trans- 
fer to itself. 
The above has illustrated the general principle that coordinated tax policies 
can lead to mutual improvements  in the setting of tax policies across coun- 
tries, even when economic pressures would otherwise force the tax structures 
toward uniformity.  However, a recent article by Kehoe (1989) has identified a 
case in which the opposite may be true. Coordinated (or cooperative) setting 
of  tax policies across countries  may yield an outcome that is inferior to the 
noncooperative  case. The example involves the time inconsistency involved 
in setting taxes on capital or income to capital. Fischer (1980) showed in a 
closed  economy framework that  the  tax  rate  on capital  that  a government 
would  choose (and therefore  like to promise)  before  the private  sector has 
made its saving decision is not the same as it would choose once the decision 
has been made. This is the case even if a government is motivated by eco- 
nomic efficiency, because once saving is committed it is in fixed supply and 
hence a good thing to tax. This time-consistent tax rate on capital income is 
inferior to the lower tax rate that would be imposed if the government could 
somehow commit itself. 
Kehoe’s point is that if capital is internationally mobile and its income can 
be taxed only at source, then tax competition results in a much lower tax rate 
than if countries cooperate in setting such rates. Suppose the optimal tax rate 
on capital income (with commitment) is zero or close to it. This outcome may 
be achievable with tax competition  but not with cooperation.  With coopera- 
tion,  countries  would  agree to tax  the fixed  capital  stock  in the integrated 
economies at a higher (time-consistent) rate. This higher rate would be antic- 
ipated by the private savers and a less efficient level of capital accumulation 
would result. We return  to the issue of cooperative harmonization  between 
Canada and the United States after exploring in more detail the ways in which 
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1.5  Some Implications of the Openness of the Economy for the Design 
of the Income Tax System 
In this section, we consider the issue of income tax policy in an open econ- 
omy, drawing on the principles that have been discussed above. The openness 
of an economy to the rest of the world, particularly to capital flows, imposes 
some constraints on policy and provides some opportunities as well. The ob- 
jective of this section is to discuss how  open economy considerations influ- 
ence a country's independent choice of an income tax system, particularly the 
tax base. These considerations could be thought of as applying independently 
to the United States and Canada. Our discussion proceeds by  first recalling 
the open economy setting and the constraints it imposes on attaining the ob- 
jectives  of  tax  policy,  given  the  stylized facts  about  the  existing circum- 
stances. Then,  the implications for tax design in a single country are dis- 
cussed. In the next section, we will extend the analysis to consider the case 
for coordinating (integrating) the tax systems of the two countries, where they 
are taken to operate in a wider world economy. 
1.5.1  The Open Economy Setting 
The key defining feature of  an open economy is the cross-border flow of 
goods and capital. For our purposes, it is the flow of capital that is most rele- 
vant. The flow of goods, tax-free or otherwise, is of limited relevance for the 
design of direct tax systems. We  will assume that the economy's capital mar- 
kets are fully open to the rest of  the world,  and that the economy can be 
viewed as essentially a small open economy on world capital markets. This 
implies that rates of return on capital arc exogenous to the country, subject 
perhaps to country-specific risk differentials. We  presume in our discussion 
that this is true for rates of return on unincorporated business capital as well 
as corporate capital, although in practice it might be argued that capital market 
imperfections might at least partly segment unincorporated businesses (and 
private corporations) from public capital markets. That is ultimately an empir- 
ical question, and one for which an answer is difficult to verify. While capital 
flows freely between countries, its owners need not. In fact, we assume that 
there is very limited international mobility of persons, so for all intents and 
purposes, residency of households can be taken as fixed. 
Our interest is in the direct tax policies of an open economy such as Can- 
ada. The country takes personal and corporate tax policies as given elsewhere. 
What is important for our purposes is to recognize that the common practice 
in the rest of  the world is for corporate taxes to be levied on an origin basis. 
Given that countries want to tax corporation income, taxing it on an origin 
basis seems to be the only alternative.'O This is achieved in a variety of ways 
10. The reasons for this are discussed, for example, in Kay and King (1990, ch.  14). Essen- 
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in different countries. For example, a country may tax the worldwide income 
of its resident corporations,  including repatriated earnings of subsidiaries op- 
erating abroad, and the income of foreign firms operating within its bounda- 
ries. A credit is then granted for taxes paid in foreign countries. Alternatively, 
repatriated earnings may be allowed to flow tax-free into the domestic econ- 
omy without credit. The effect in either case is that corporate income is ap- 
proximately taxed on an origin basis. 
At the same time, the personal tax is typically  levied on some notion of 
income and on a residence basis.  Different countries apply widely differing 
personal tax rates to differing bases. However, given the relatively low degree 
of labor mobility between most countries, this is not a significant constraint. 
Countries  are relatively  free to  set  their  own  personal tax  systems as they 
wish. 
The real constraints arise in the treatment of capital income and particularly 
from the fact that while personal income is taxed on a residence basis, corpo- 
rate income is taxed on an origin basis. As mentioned in section 1.4, the ideal 
tax from an economic point of view might be a tax on persons  levied on a 
residence  basis  (perhaps  supplemented  by  a  consistent  system  of  indirect 
taxes). If  the personal tax base is to be income, it is useful to supplement it 
with a corporate tax for withholding purposes. In an open economy, a further 
withholding role for the corporate tax is implied by the existence of origin- 
based corporate taxes elsewhere in the world. Thus, the income tax system 
becomes  one  of  residence-based  personal  taxation  combined  with  origin- 
based corporate taxation. 
It is this conflict between the use of residence and origin bases in the same 
system that leads to constraints  in tax policy. The small open economy as- 
sumption effectively  segments the  savings side of  capital markets from the 
investment  side (i.e., savings and investment are independently determined 
and need not be equal in any given year). The implication of this mixture of 
residence and origin principles is that tax measures operating through the per- 
sonal tax system affect only the savings side of the market, while corporate 
tax measures affect only the investment side. This makes it very difficult to 
implement the ideal personal tax system. 
Suppose that income is the desired personal tax base.  One would like to 
include in the base as many types of capital income as are feasible. This basi- 
cally means income from business capital assets, since income from personal 
they prefer. An  alternative view has been put forward by  Musgrave (1990), that some notion of 
“internation equity” provides countries with a right to tax income earned by  corporations within 
their jurisdictions.  In the concluding section of this paper we suggest that a residence-based sys- 
tem has certain advantages over a source-based system of  corporate taxation, but that some inter- 
national cooperation would be required to achieve it. 
11. Again,  this is only partially adhered to, given the system of  withholding taxes and the 
practice of some countries (e.g., the U.S.)  of  taxing citizens on a worldwide basis regardless of 
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assets such as human capital and consumer durables are difficult to tax. The 
tax should be levied on an accrual basis, which is difficult to do in the case of 
capital gains, so capital gains are typically taxed when realized. A corporate 
tax can then be supported as a means of taxing retained earnings as they ac- 
crue within the corporation, so that taxes cannot be postponed indefinitely by 
keeping them within the corporate sector.  l2 The existence of origin-based cor- 
porate taxes elsewhere in the world further supports the use of a corporate tax 
as a withholding device. 
The corporate tax will typically apply on all equity income in the corpora- 
tion and not only retained earnings. Otherwise, the objective of  withholding 
from foreigners would not be satisfied. In the absence of further measures, the 
tax system would still discriminate systematically in  favor of  retained earn- 
ings and against new share issues because of the so-called trapped equity ef- 
fect. To avoid this, it has been argued, for example by the Carter Commission 
in Canada, that the corporate tax should be integrated with the personal tax. 
This would undo the discriminatory double taxation of  equity income from 
new share issues under the two taxes and would put corporate and unincorpo- 
rated income on a par. As a practical necessity, the integration must be done 
at the personal level. That is, it cannot discriminate between domestic and 
foreign corporations, since to do so would entail the loss of tax crediting by 
foreign governments and the consequent loss of the tax transfer from foreign 
treasuries. 
However, integration of the two taxes by a measure such as the dividend tax 
credit at the personal level would affect primarily the savings side of the capi- 
tal market. While full integration would eliminate the discriminatory treat- 
ment of  new share issues relative to retained earnings (as well as unincorpo- 
rated business income), it can be  shown that it would do so by  effectively 
removing the taxation of capital income on equity income at the personal level 
altogether. l3 The upshot would be a personal tax system in which only interest 
income is taxed, and a corporate tax system that serves to distort the invest- 
ment side of the market by taxing equity income at source. In fact, the corpo- 
ration would have a tax incentive to finance its investments by  debt, while 
taxes would favor households holding equity. 
Thus, it seems to be difficult to tax capital income properly at the personal 
level in an open economy, at least in the absence of accrual-based capital gains 
taxation. If the latter could be implemented, then a classical corporate income 
tax system might be used for withholding from foreigners. However, the dif- 
ferential  tax  treatment  of  corporate  and  unincorporated business  income 
12. Note that keeping funds within the corporate sector does not imply keeping them within the 
same corporation. Thus, a corporation with excess funds on hand could keep them in the corporate 
sector for the shareholders by, for example, acquiring shares of another corporation or even taking 
it over. Given the intercorporate tax-free flow of dividends, the funds can continue to accumulate 
free of additional tax. This is just the trapped-equity effect mentioned below, and it provides a 
strong incentive for takeovers by mature firms. 
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would remain. As well, debt would still be favored at the corporate level be- 
cause of the interest deductibility provisions of the tax. This would be the case 
independent of the personal tax treatment of interest income, again because of 
the separation of the savings and investment side of the capital market. 
1  S.2  Income Tax Policy in an Open Economy 
What does all this imply for tax policy in a small open economy? Consider 
first the personal tax base. Fundamentally, the choice is between an imperfect 
income base and a consumption base. Equivalently, the issue can be put in 
terms of what types of asset income should be included in the tax base.14 A 
consumption base would effectively include no asset income. It is well known 
how that can be achieved in a fairly exact and administratively feasible man- 
ner. An  income base will typically include only some forms of asset income. 
Consumer durables and human capital income are typically excluded, as are 
many  forms of  assets yielding  imputed returns (cash balances, insurance, 
etc.). That leaves mainly business assets in their many forms. These include 
real interest income on debt (with payments and receipts treated symmetri- 
cally) and all forms of accrued equity income (dividends, real capital gains, 
unincorporated business income, rents, royalties, etc.). Of course, in practice 
even many business assets go untaxed at the personal level, since they are 
financed from tax-sheltered pension funds. 
Administratively, the full and proper taxation of income on business assets 
is difficult to achieve under a personal tax alone. Apart from the requirement 
to index capital income, there is the need to measure accrued capital income. 
This is difficult to do properly for unincorporated business income. It is also 
difficult to do for capital gains, so capital gains must for practical purposes be 
taxed on realization. 
That being the case, in the absence of complementary tax devices, a signif- 
icant part of capital income could accumulate in tax-sheltered form within the 
corporation by retaining and reinvesting  As discussed, one of the 
functions of  the corporate tax is to act as such a complementary device for 
the personal tax. In the closed economy, it can do so more or less perfectly. A 
corporate tax on equity income of the corporation, with its rate set to the top 
marginal rate of the personal tax and fully integrated with the personal tax by 
means of a dividend tax credit with the same rate, will serve the purpose. It 
will succeed in taxing retained earnings on the same basis as new equity issues 
and will fully remove the differential tax treatment of new equity issues, re- 
tained earnings, debt, and unincorporated business assets. It was for this rea- 
son that the Carter Commission recommended such a system for Canada in 
14. It is important to note that we are dealing only with the choice of base here. In principle, 
the rate structure can be chosen independently of the base. Therefore, whatever the base, a more 
or less arbitrary degree of progressivity can be achieved by appropriate choice of the rate structure. 
15. Note that the reinvestment can take the form of  purchasing shares in other corporations, or 
of keeping the funds within private corporations. As long as the funds are not taken out of the 
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the mid-1960s. Note that with a fully integrated personal and corporate tax 
system, the need to tax capital gains disappears altogether, at both the corpo- 
rate and the personal levels. If  capital gains continue to be taxed, they too 
should be fully integrated with the personal tax.  I6  The tax-free flow of inter- 
corporate dividends should remain. 
Even this seemingly simple system is complicated to administer in its ideal 
form. For one thing, capital income should ideally be included in the tax base 
on an real accrued basis. This implies that the base should be indexed. It also 
means that accrued equity income would have to be measured for both corpo- 
rations and unincorporated businesses. As is well known, this is difficult to 
do. For another, the interest deductibility provision gives rise to certain anom- 
alies. The fact that businesses (both corporate and noncorporate) need only be 
taxed on their equity income means that interest should be deductible from the 
tax base, at least in real terms. The unlimited ability of firms to deduct inter- 
est, combined with  integration achieved via a dividend tax  credit (and the 
absence of a capital gains tax), implies that there is a tax arbitrage opportunity 
that must be closed off, involving the ability of a shareholder to use the cor- 
poration as a device for tax arbitrage by using the interest deductibility provi- 
sion. If the corporate tax rate exceeds the personal tax rate on interest income, 
shareholders can be made better off if the corporation borrows to pay out div- 
idends."  Naturally, there will be a limit to the firm's ability to do this. Credi- 
tors may impose restrictions on the borrowing of  the firm for this purpose 
because of the absence of collateral or the risks of bankruptcy. The arbitrage 
may be less direct than the above. For example, the borrowed funds may be 
used indirectly for the buying of shares of other corporations, as in the case of 
takeovers financed by debt. This tax advantage of  takeovers is quite separate 
from that arising due to the trapped equity effect mentioned above. In the latter 
case, the takeover arises from the fact that the firm has excess funds on hand 
in the corporation already, while debt-financed takeovers (leveraged buyouts) 
may be viewed as pure tax arbitrage operations using outside funds. 
This tax arbitrage opportunity arises because the debt the firm is issuing is 
not being used to purchase business capital-producing revenues for the firm, 
but is being used simply to pay out funds either directly or indirectly to equity 
holders. One obvious way to close it off would be by limitations on the deduc- 
tibility of interest. For example, firms might be restricted to deducting interest 
on debt used to acquire business capital only, though presumably this might 
be difficult to enforce. Alternatively, there might be some restriction imposed 
16. This is demonstrated analytically in Boadway and Bruce (in press). 
17. For example, suppose the corporation borrows $100 in perpetuity at  an interest rate  i and 
immediately pays out the proceeds as a dividend. If the effective personal tax on dividends is T, 
shareholders receive $(1 -  T)IOO after tax. In  the future, dividends must fall each period by  $i 
(1 -  u)IOO,  where u is the corporate tax rate and interest deductibility is assumed. Thus, share- 
holders' dividends fall by $i(l -  u)(l -  ~)100  each period. From the point of view of the share- 
holder, the present value of this financial transaction is $(1  -  ~)100[1- (- u)/(1 -  r)], where r 
is the personal income tax rate. As long as u >  t, shareholders will be better off. Similar principles 
apply if the firm is able to repurchase shares using the initial funds. 64  Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce 
on the use of the dividend tax credit. For example, dividends might only be 
eligible for the dividend tax credit if  they were paid from after-tax profits. 
Again, this might be difficult to administer. The Carter Commission (1966) 
recommended a similar scheme, whereby the total tax credited to shareholders 
would be restricted to taxes actually paid at the corporate level. This was re- 
jected partly for administrative reasons. It could also be rejected for other 
reasons in an open economy, as discussed below. 
Another, related, difficulty in integrating personal and corporate taxes with 
the dividend tax credit in the personal tax system concerns the fact that differ- 
ent corporations are liable to differing tax rates. Statutory tax rates differ for 
firms of different size, for firms in different industries, and for firms in differ- 
ent provinces (or states). To the extent that these differing tax rates are imple- 
mented explicitly for industrial policy reasons, the granting of a uniform tax 
credit is appropriate. To do otherwise would effectively undo the preferential 
treatment (at least in a closed economy; see below). However, in the case of 
differential rates across provinces, different dividend tax credit rates might be 
desired in an ideal world. Also, if  firms face different effective tax rates be- 
cause some are in a nontaxpaying position, full crediting would not seem to 
be sensible. This situation could be avoided by  full loss offsetting in the tax 
system. 
Finally, the use of corporate taxation by more than one level of government 
increases the complexity of  integrating the corporate and personal tax sys- 
tems, even in a system as highly coordinated as that of Canada-or  even in a 
closed economy. The problem is  that  while  the corporate tax  is  levied at 
source, the dividend tax credit is applied against personal taxes, which are 
levied on a residence basis. To the extent that shareholders in one province 
own corporate shares in another, the crediting will come at the expense of a 
different province, which collected the corporate taxes. Provinces that are net 
corporate capital importers from other provinces will benefit, and vice versa.  Is 
This is an unavoidable consequence in a system of  integration applying to 
personal taxes. In a closed economy, it can probably be avoided by  applying 
dividend relief at the corporate level, that is, by allowing firms to deduct div- 
idends from their corporate tax base, with the so-called dividend-paid deduc- 
tion. In an open economy such a remedy would not be available, as discussed 
below. 
The upshot of  this discussion is that even in a closed economy the task of 
designing a reasonable corporate and personal  income tax  system is not a 
straightforward one, even given that at the outset certain types of asset income 
are necessarily excluded (i.e., basically nonbusiness asset income). The prob- 
lems of properly accounting for capital income and of using the corporate tax 
effectively as a withholding device are significant. It is partly for this reason 
18. This will be at least partly offset by the system of equalization, which operates on both the 
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that many economists have argued in favor of using personal consumption or 
its equivalent as the tax base. 
In an open economy, the problems are even greater.  Suppose a country 
wants to tax its residents on their income, including accrued capital income. 
In addition, it wants to exploit any tax transfers from foreign treasuries that 
international tax  crediting arrangements permit. If  the personal tax  system 
cannot tax capital gains on accrual, a corporation income tax is required for 
the purposes both of  withholding at source against domestic residents and 
transferring taxes from foreign treasuries. The corporate tax will have to be a 
tax on equity income defined, not as the policy maker might ideally define it 
for domestic withholding purposes, but to conform with the tax systems of 
creditor nations. In the absence of  integration provisions, the corporate and 
personal tax systems will favor retained earnings at the expense of new share 
issues, and will favor unincorporated businesses relative to corporations. An 
attempt to integrate must involve a dividend tax credit applied at the personal 
level. The dividend-paid deduction would not be a desirable instrument here, 
since it would apply to dividends paid both to residents and to foreigners, and 
that  would  effectively  negate  any  withholding  against foreign treasuries. 
Furthermore, assigning the dividend tax credit on the basis of corporate taxes 
paid (as suggested by Carter) would not be desirable in an open economy for 
the same reason. 
All the problems mentioned above for designing an integrated corporate 
and personal tax system for the closed economy would continue to apply. In 
the open economy, there would be more. A fully integrated corporate and 
personal tax system achieved using the dividend tax credit would succeed in 
removing the differential tax treatment of new equity issues and retained earn- 
ings and would remove the differential tax treatment of corporate and noncor- 
porate equity, but it would do so by removing the tax on equity income at the 
personal level altogether. Only personal interest income would remain taxed. 
This system hardly constitutes taxing persons on an income basis. To  do 
that would involve foregoing integration altogether (as in the U.S. case), plus 
taxing capital gains on accrual. Failure to do the latter would allow persons to 
shelter retained earning within the corporate sector. Given that it is difficult to 
tax capital gains on an accrual basis, the alternatives for personal taxation in 
an open economy would seem to be as follows:19 
i.  Tax  capital  income  to  the  extent possible,  which  means  in  practice 
roughly the way  it is taxed now.  Interest, dividends, rents, and royalties are 
all taxed as received (with full loss offset). Unincorporated business income is 
taxed on accrual,  albeit imperfectly. Capital gains are taxed on realization. 
The corporate tax is integrated with the personal tax. As mentioned, such a 
19. In all these options, we presume that a corporate tax is in effect. Because of the segmenta- 
tion of the savings and investment sides of the market, what is done at the personal level can be 
evaluated separately from what is done at the corporate level. We  return to the corporate level 
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system  effectively  means that  equity  income goes untaxed  at the  personal 
level, while interest is taxed. Persons have an incentive to hold equity income, 
while firms have  an incentive  to finance with debt.  There is no differential 
treatment of corporate and unincorporated forms, nor of  these forms and per- 
sonal assets. However, this outcome is achieved by essentially removing much 
of capital income from the personal  tax base.  (The Canadian system is like 
this, except that integration is not full, and pension and RRSP funds are shel- 
tered.) The dividend tax credit provision does not apply on funds invested in 
sheltered form; that is appropriate in the open economy setting. It would, of 
course, be desirable to index capital income for inflation. As well, the prob- 
lems with unlimited interest deductibility, mentioned above, remain. 
ii. Tax capital income as in (i), but do not integrate the personal and corpo- 
rate tax systems. In this case, part of equity income is taxed (i.e., new equity 
issues), but retained earnings are not. Persons have an incentive to accumulate 
wealth within the corporation rather than to hold debt or acquire new equity. 
As above, firms prefer to finance by debt because of the interest deductibility 
provisions. Corporate equity is discriminated against vis-A-vis unincorporated 
equity. The result is a tax system much like the U.S. system. It is far from an 
ideal income tax system, since it includes many interasset distortions. 
iii. Use consumption as the base for the personal tax by following the pre- 
scription of the U.S. Treasury Bfueprinrs (1977) as adopted for Canada by the 
Economic  Council of Canada (1986). The corporate tax should not be inte- 
grated with the personal tax in this case. Unincorporated business assets are 
taxed on a cash-flow basis or its equivalent, as outlined in Boadway and Bruce 
(1984). This would avoid all the interasset distortions at the personal tax level 
as outlined  above, leaving only the distortions  caused by the corporate tax. 
Given the extent to which assets are currently sheltered in the Canadian per- 
sonal tax system, this would not require a major departure from the present 
system. 
Given these options for personal taxation, it could be said at the least that 
considerations  of an open economy nature strengthen the case for consump- 
tion, as opposed to income, taxation  at the personal  level.  Ultimately,  the 
decision involves weighing these considerations against other equity and effi- 
ciency objectives of taxation. 
Next, consider the corporate tax. In a closed economy, the main argument 
for a corporate tax follows from its role as a withholding device against earn- 
ings retained  within the corporation. This role is considerably  weakened  in 
the open economy because of the segmentation of the investment side of the 
market  from the savings side. In  a small open economy, the corporate tax 
essentially distorts the investment decision without affecting the savings side 
at all. However, in an open economy, the corporate tax acquires another with- 
holding role, against foreign corporations that can credit taxes at home (or are 
exempt from taxes at home on foreign income). This becomes the main role 
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The exact design of the corporate tax for this purpose depends on two op- 
posing considerations (from the perspective of the small open economy). On 
the one hand, the desire to extract as large a tax transfer as possible from 
foreign treasuries would suggest mimicking foreign tax regimes to the extent 
possible. On the other hand, taxing foreign corporations means unavoidably 
taxing domestic ones as well. This consideration implies that a distortion is 
imposed on domestic firms’ investment decisions. It would support as low a 
tax rate as possible. Some judgment must be made as to the balance between 
these opposing objectives. Presumably, the greater the proportion of  assets 
held by foreign-owned firms, the higher the corporate tax rate would be, and 
vice versa. 
1.6  Cooperative Income Tax Policies between Two  Open Economies 
The above discussion concerned tax policy for an economy whose capital 
markets are open to international capital flows. Tax  harmonization involves 
coordinating the taxes of more than one country. The question addressed now 
is whether there are any significant advantages to be gained from two coun- 
tries, both operating in a wider world economy, coordinating their tax sys- 
tems,  given that each of  them has its own tax policy objectives. We  have 
already seen that there are certain pressures for a single country’s tax system 
to conform in certain ways with those of other nations, even when it operates 
independently. The issue is whether there are additional gains to be had from 
further cooperation between two such countries. 
The analogy with tax harmonization in a single country with a federal sys- 
tem of government might seem to be apt here. The Canadian case is instruc- 
tive. In Canada (as in the United States), the federal and the provincial gov- 
ernments use both the personal and the corporation income taxes. Residents 
are subject to taxes at both levels of  government. Furthermore, residents are 
free to move from one province to another. In these circumstances, explicit 
income tax harmonization makes a lot of  sense. On the administrative side, 
harmonization can allow for a single tax collection authority and thereby re- 
duce collection and compliance costs significantly. At the personal level, har- 
monization of the base and the rate structure reduces the possibility of  ineffi- 
ciencies in the allocation of labor across provinces by reducing the ability of 
the provinces to use the tax structure to attract desirable types of  persons. 
However, the use of  a common base and rate structure necessarily implies 
some loss of sovereignty of different units of government in tax policy. This is 
resolved in Canada heavily in the federal government’s favor, though it is not 
clear that this situation will continue indefinitely, given the growing relative 
importance of the provinces in the collection of personal income tax revenues. 
Harmonization of  the personal tax  structure also allows for a system of 
imputation applying across provinces, whereby tax credit is awarded for cor- 
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the corporate tax  is collected on a source basis, imputation at the personal 
level involves some interprovincial redistribution of  tax revenues. However, 
this is likely to be offset considerably by the extensive system of interprovin- 
cial redistribution that occurs through the grant system, especially the system 
of  equalization and Established Programs Financing transfers. Indeed, it is 
this system of equalizing transfers that also reduces the use of the personal tax 
system for tax competition. 
At the same time, the fact that integration occurs at the personal level means 
that the rate of imputation is the same across provinces, despite the fact that 
corporate tax rates may vary from one province to another. This seems to be 
an unavoidable consequence of having to integrate at the personal level rather 
than the corporate level. Even if  different provinces could select their own 
rates of  imputation (and there is probably no reason why they should not be 
allowed to), there is no ideal rate. If  the Canadian economy were a closed 
one, it would be better to apply the imputation at the corporate level, say, by 
a dividend-paid deduction against corporate taxes paid. But this is not a sen- 
sible alternative in  an open economy, because it would effectively undo any 
withholding against foreigners whose own corporate tax systems operate on 
an origin basis. 
Harmonization of  the corporate tax also entails the potential benefits of  a 
single tax collection authority (although three provinces take no advantage of 
it). The main advantage of tax harmonization is the use of a common base. In 
addition to reducing compliance costs, the use of  a common base facilitates 
the use of formula apportionment for allocating corporate income to province 
of  origin. The use of  a formula, though to some extent arbitrary, limits the 
ability of a firm to engage in tax arbitrage activities, especially those involv- 
ing financial transactions designed simply to change the province in which the 
firm takes its profits. Of  course, since no allocation formula will be perfect, 
there will remain some incentives for conducting operations in one province 
relative to another. Those incentives will depend upon the differential in tax 
rates across provinces. Again, the system of federal-provincial transfers min- 
imizes these differentials, though presumably it does not eliminate tax com- 
petition altogether. 
When we move to the Canada-U.S. setting, there are several institutional 
differences that considerably weaken the case for extending a form of tax har- 
monization. First, there is no single higher level of government with a man- 
date to implement a tax policy according to a single objective. That is, there 
is  no  analogy with  the  federal government in  a federal country.  Second, 
though residents are mobile internally within a federation, they are essentially 
immobile internationally, unless the nations have agreed to a common market; 
this is not the case for Canada and the United States. Third, there is no system 
of  redistributive grants between nations such as exists within a federation 
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wise offset the anomalies that can occur from the fact that while corporate 
taxes  are levied  at source, personal  taxes are levied on a residence basis. 
Taken  together, these considerations imply to us  that the two countries are 
unlikely to benefit greatly from tax harmonization of the sort used in the Ca- 
nadian federation. 
Given the immobility of labor across the two countries, taxation of personal 
incomes on a residency basis allows each country to pursue its own domestic 
tax policy  objectives with  minimal constraints. Thus,  the openness of  the 
economy seems not to constrain one country from imposing a substantially 
different personal tax base or rate structure from the other. Canada could, for 
example,  adopt a personal consumption base  independently of  the  United 
States. Similarly, the decision whether or not to impute corporate tax liabili- 
ties against personal taxes could be taken independently by  each country - 
as has been done. We have seen that this decision is effectively the same in an 
open economy as the decision as to whether to tax equity income fully at the 
personal level or not. 
It  is at the level of the corporate tax that international harmonization be- 
comes more of  a possibility, especially given the ability of  capital to flow 
between countries more or less unrestricted. As mentioned, international cap- 
ital mobility will already induce some harmonization in the tax system, since 
it will be in the interest of  a given country to adopt a tax system similar to 
those operating abroad, under international tax crediting arrangements. Any 
further harmonization that can be achieved by agreement would involve at the 
least a common base. Since there is no natural ideal base for the corporate tax, 
this would remove the discretion that otherwise exists at the national level, 
thus reducing a country’s independence to conduct tax policy with domestic 
objectives in mind. Similar arguments might be applied to the rate structure. 
There is already considerable pressure for harmonization of  rates. It is not 
obvious that there is much to be gained from further explicit agreement. 
Beyond this, the two countries may prefer to harmonize their integration 
systems. If  this  could  be  done at  the corporate level by,  say,  a system of 
dividend-paid deductions, the ideal integration system could be achieved. Un- 
fortunately, it would be difficult to do, since it would require treating firms 
resident in one of the two countries in a different manner from other foreign 
firms. Such discrimination would presumably not be compatible with existing 
international treaty conventions. Either the dividend deduction would have to 
apply to all firms, which would not be desirable from an international tax 
transfer perspective, or the integration would have to occur at the personal 
level, in which case there is little to be gained from harmonization of  the 
corporate bases. We  have already seen that when integration is applied at the 
personal level, there is no reason why different countries cannot pursue inde- 
pendently different policies, one integrating and the other not. 
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tion, especially in the form of reduced compliance and collection costs. Sig- 
nificant benefits would probably require implementing some form of formula 
apportionment system for allocating the tax base between jurisdictions. How- 
ever, for this to be of  real value, agreement on common base would be re- 
quired. Then only one set of accounts would need to be compiled for the two 
countries. Of  course, the need for separate accounting with other countries 
would not be avoided. A common base with formula apportionment would 
simplify the system for taxpayers, remove some incentives for wasteful tax 
planning, and avoid double-taxation problems within the two countries. At 
the same time, it would involve considerable loss in sovereignty to the agree- 
ing governments, since both would have to accept the same tax base. 
The chances of  this outcome being achieved are remote indeed as far as 
Canada and the United States are concerned. While Canada’s corporate in- 
come tax system is highly harmonized within the country among the various 
jurisdictions, the same is not true of the United States. A prerequisite to inter- 
national harmonization is harmonization within each country. In the absence 
of this, the chance for adopting formula apportionment with a common base 
is limited. Of  course, it would still be possible to apportion without using a 
common base, but many of the advantages would be lost. 
Nevertheless, there are some partial measures that could be adopted to the 
mutual advantage of both countries. A good example of cross-border “com- 
plementarity” between measures undertaken to improve compliance is the use 
of  withholding taxes on investment income. As mentioned earlier, a major 
disadvantage for the individual country in imposing such withholding taxes 
on domestic financial institutions is that residents can easily shift their savings 
abroad. Thus, the attempt to improve compliance may be counterproductive. 
If, however, the United States and Canada both impose withholding taxes on 
investment income, compliance is improved in both countries, providing sav- 
ings cannot be shifted to third countries. Note that in this regard, tax treaty 
provisions that specify special low withholding-tax rates for partner countries 
would be undesirable. 
Another potential area of cooperation is the use of the corporation income 
tax system to offer economic incentives to certain activities; for example, a 
corporation income tax credit for R&D spending could be offered. Under the 
existing system of taxation for cross-border income flows, the impact of such 
an incentive is blunted for R&D activities carried on by  U.S. multinationals 
in  Canada, because of  the U.S. foreign tax crediting arrangements. Rather 
than offering these corporations tax relief for carrying out R&D expenditures, 
these arrangements mean that revenues are transferred to the U.S. Treasury. 
From the firm’s perspective, lower taxes paid in Canada simply imply higher 
taxes paid when the income is repatriated to the United States. However, if the 
repatriation is far enough in the future, the Canadian tax relief can have some 
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foreign source income are likely to reduce the effects of Canadian tax incen- 
tives. 2o 
The United States could enable Canada to better use its corporation income 
tax to pursue industrial policy objectives by also adopting an exemption sys- 
tem, or by allowing qualifying Canadian tax incentives to reduce U.S. corpo- 
ration income taxes on repatriated incomes (so-called tax sparing). The latter 
would be difficult to do on a bilateral basis, since the United States has stead- 
fastly refused to offer tax sparing to developing countries, unlike some other 
capital-exporting industrial economies. This refusal is supported by the belief 
that unless a compelling market-failure rationale for the incentive exists, the 
incentive could cause an inefficient allocation of  capital between countries, 
with the cost being borne by the United States. Also, it is believed that cou- 
pling the present deferral advantage with tax sparing will offer excessive re- 
lief. 
The main argument against replacing the U.S.  foreign tax credit with  an 
exemption system is that the latter invites the capital-importing countries to 
attract income from the United States by offering a lower corporate tax rate- 
the typical negative spillover policy. However, this could be mitigated by al- 
lowing the exemption to apply only to particular forms of  income in listed 
countries, such as Canada does. The main problem with this solution is that 
the Canadian system seems inordinately complex and is perhaps unmanage- 
able for U.S. multinationals that operate in numerous countries. Also, as long 
as Canada and the United States each maintain certain corporate tax prefer- 
ences that are perceived as working against the other country’s interests, such 
as the special tax rate for manufacturing and processing income in Canada and 
the Foreign Sales Corporation provisions in the United States, agreement to 
recognize each other’s corporate tax incentives will be difficult to obtain. 
The market pressures for a high degree of  uniformity in the corporation 
income tax structures of Canada and the United States probably constrain the 
abilities of  both countries to pursue national tax policies, even when those 
policies do not interfere with the other country. It  is less obvious that the 
disadvantages are so great that the two countries will find it desirable to adopt 
a coordinated approach to the taxation of multinational corporations operating 
in both countries. 
1.7  Concluding Remarks: Worldwide Tax Harmonization 
The previous discussion was predicated on the fact that Canada and the 
United States operate in a broader world context, in which certain tax institu- 
20.  A  similar situation does not apply to the impact of  U.S.  corporate tax incentives on the 
activities of Canadian foreign affiliates operating there,  because Canada exempts most income 
repatriated from the U.S. from corporate  taxation.  Thus, U.S. corporate tax  reliefs act as tax 
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tions are taken as given. In particular, it has been assumed that, while personal 
tax systems adhere to the residence principle, corporate tax systems use the 
origin or source principle. That is, foreign tax liabilities of home country cor- 
porations on their income earned abroad is credited against domestic tax lia- 
bilities.  In  such a system, an ideal income (or consumption)  tax  system is 
impossible  to achieve.  The corporate tax becomes partly  a device for with- 
holding against foreign treasuries. The combination of the residence principle 
for personal taxation and the source principle for corporate taxation makes it 
impossible to avoid distortions on capital markets. For example, it is not pos- 
sible  to  implement a proper imputation  system so as to ensure that  equity 
income is taxed only once and is treated equivalently to interest income. 
If  a way  could be found to tax  corporations  on a residence  basis, these 
problems could be avoided. In principle, such an outcome is possible; in this 
final section, we explore it briefly. Essentially all that is involved is for coun- 
tries to adopt a deduction system for foreign tax liabilities, rather than a credit 
system. Under such a system, provided all countries behave as if they have no 
market power in international  capital markets, the incentive would exist for 
them to adopt a residence-based corporate tax system. 
Consider first a capital-importing country, in which capital imports come 
from countries in which a deduction  system is used. In such a system it can 
easily be demonstrated that the transfer of revenues from the treasury of the 
creditor  country is not  possible. Any  attempt  to extract  tax  revenues  from 
foreign corporations will result in an outflow of  foreign capital until the tax is 
fully shifted back to the residents of the taxing country. In such a setting the 
home country could follow several different tax policies. If  it wishes to tax 
income comprehensively at home, but is unable to tax capital gains on ac- 
crual, it could levy a general corporate tax on all corporations.  Then, to im- 
pute the tax it could offer a dividend-paid  deduction to corporations as divi- 
dends are paid out. It would want to do so both for domestically owned and 
foreign corporations. Not to do so for foreign corporations would simply drive 
out capital and impose a tax burden on domestic residents.*' The income tax 
system would be properly integrated, and income would be taxed once in the 
hands of  residents. Furthermore, there would be no incentive for capital to be 
misallocated internationally  on account of the corporate tax system applying 
at source. Note also that no further withholding taxes would be desired, again 
assuming that the deduction system applied to them as well. 
It would  be  somewhat more difficult to operate a classical  corporate tax 
system, as discussed in section 1.4. To do so would require giving a dividend- 
paid deduction only to foreigners, and this would  be difficult to administer. 
Furthermore, it  would  seem to provide incentives  for evasion by  domestic 
corporations. 
21. One might think an alternative would be simply to levy that tax on domestic corporations 
alone. However, this would be difficult to administer, since it would be necessary to identify and 
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If the country wishes to tax residents on a consumption tax basis, it could 
do away  with  the  corporate  tax  as a withholding  device altogether.  There 
would be no need to withhold against domestic residents, since capital income 
would not be taxed. And because it is not possible to transfer tax revenues 
from foreign treasuries,  it is unnecessary to withhold against foreigners. The 
role of  business taxation would be reduced to that of collecting pure profits. 
For that some form of cash-flow tax or its equivalent would suffice. 
From the point of view of creditor countries, such a system would seem to 
be preferable to the existing one, since it eliminates the transfer of tax reve- 
nues they  now  face  under  the  credit  system.  Creditor-country  tax  policies 
could be constructed exactly as above. They could operate an integrated tax 
system by imposing a corporate tax and imputing at the corporate level by a 
dividend-paid deduction. Or they could operate a consumption tax system by 
avoiding the use of the corporate tax for withholding purposes at all. Again, a 
classical system is somewhat more difficult to administer for the same reason 
as above. 
If both creditor and capital-importing countries adopted such a residence- 
based corporate tax system, international production inefficiencies could be 
avoided and all countries could adopt the residence-based tax structure that 
most  accorded  with  their  policy  objectives.  Bringing about  such  a  system 
would seem to be difficult, since it apparently involves agreement by all coun- 
tries simultaneously. However, it is not obvious why explicit agreement would 
be required. It would seem to be in the interest of creditor countries to move 
to a deduction  system. If  they did  so, even  one by  one, capital-importing 
countries would be induced to follow suit. One of the great unsolved questions 
of international tax theory is why creditor countries continue to use the credit 
system, when it seems clearly to be in their interest to use the deduction sys- 
tem instead. 
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